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Preface
At the request of the NAtionAl Aeronautic. and Space Administration
(NASA), the N.tional Re'~4rch Council'. Aeron4utici dnd Space
Engln~ering Board (ASE8) undertook a study of NASA'. evolving space
atation proguaa. The .tudy, "Spaco Stuion Engineering and 'i'echnolog)'
Development." VAS c.:arr\eu out by an ad hoc cOl'lllllittee of the ASEB. It
va. directed at 4 review of program pl.nnin~ with focus on engineeriog
and technical development related to the initial operational configura-
tion and the near-term evolution of the space station. Th~ ad hoc
coaaittec: aho gave att~ntion to techniCAl lUn_gc:'l%lCnt utters.
The co~ittee members, who have industry, unlyersity, and government
experience, vere briefed by t~SA ataff member. involved in the apace
atation progum. TIle deliberations and findings of the cort!1littee .are
diacusaed in thi, report.
The document containa an executive $u~ary, & scction on hiacorical
informac ion, and a bri~f review of the current progralll plan. 'l'hi.
material is included to provlde background inform~cion for persona not
familiar with the space atation program. TIle work of the ad hoc
committee is reflected in the last two sections of the report. These
sections deal with system and engineering development status and
program issues.
v
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Executive Summary
ASSICNMENT
The National Aeronautics and Splice Administration (NASA) requested Ii,'
the Aeronautics and Space Engine~riflglJoar'd {ASEn> of the National
Reoearch Council to assemble a ~roup experienC:ed·1n enRin~erinRand
technology management to review NASA's spJice space Btation program.
Members of the p,roup were not to be directly involved in the proRram.
In response the ASEB formed the Committee on Space Station F.ngi.l~erinR
and TechnoloRY Development. The committee was asked to review NASA's
program of engineering and technology development for the initial space
station, includil~ such factors as on-orbit maintenance, operational
autonomy, and the nature of the research and technology to be conducted
in space. NASA asked the committee to pay particular attentiont.o ~
planning for'the evolution of the space station into a mo(e versatile V
system.
When the study was under wsy, however, it became evident that the
research and technology development to be conducted in space would not
receive priority consideration hy NASA or the committee because de-
taTled"con'sideratlon was premature. Thus, with NASA's concurrence the j
committee did not address these subjects.
After dcliberat ion, the committee focu8e,!._~!!.,«$SessingNASA's
planned technical program anti its appr'o'iich' to developinR the technical
foundation for the evolving space station. The objectives of the
space station program are to provide for a permanent manned presence
in orbit, the capability for scientists to conduct studies of the
earth's environment and other subjects from orbit, the use of space
for research and technology and product development and production,
activities to advance space exploration, and station growth. The
mission, operational requirements, development schedule, and cost
assumptions were to have been outside the scope of the study, but
because they affect the engineering and technical aspects of the
proKram, the committee oirl give these matters some attention. ~
cOmlllittee and NASA recognized that thl!space station program is jU!Jt
beKtnniiig and that many key enRineering and management decisions ha':'e
not been made. NASA intended the committee to assist in identiffing~
1
·,
2
critical issues, many of which could bereaolved by NASA early in the
cour.e of proy,ram development.
This report is based on the data presented to the committee,
discussions with experts presenting the data, and the committee'.
assessment of this information.
ACTIVITY
The committee held its first meetinR in March 1984 in W4shinRton,
D.C. NASA briefed it on the operational and engin~ering philosophy
behind the effort directed at defining space station requirements,
configuration analyse., technolo~y program content and issues, and
program evolution lind 1Il8naRelllent. Thl! cOftllllittee then formed one panel
to addreu WOl"k as8i~ned to NASA' 8 Marshall Space Flight Center (HSFC)
and its associated centers and another to consider work aosigned to
NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC) and associated centers. The
cOlMlittee and its paneh also ident Hied technical policy and
management issues to help guide the study.
In April the MSFC panel was briefed on space operations, structureft
and materials, propulsion and fluids, engineering, and station stabili-
zation and control. In May. the JSC pnnel WdS briefed on environmental
control, hUinan factors, life support, thermal control, data managelllent,
communications. ~lectric power. nnd systems operations, and the ful~
committee was briefed on other selected aspects of the program: sys-
tems engineering activity, reference configurations, evolutionary
designs, user requirements. mission definition. and program management.
In August, a special panel of the committee met with NASA represen-
tatives in Washington, D.C•• to review plans for deye19P.lng sJ>.Jar
thermOdynamic electric power generationtechnoJogy. In a w~rkshop at
the National Academy of Sciences Study Center at Woods Hole, Massachu-
setts. NASA hrought the committee up to date on the activities of the
space station progra~. Panels met to address issues of technical and
management policy, and a draft of this report was developed.
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee concluded that there is an adequate national tech-
nical base to support development of the space station. However. high
near-term performance benefits and long-term cost savin~s can be
reali zed } fee ~..!!.i n_~11~&~..~U.Q.YI!.r.!~.~(L t_e_~JJ~o !.Q.g i e !..!.....~~?!!_e,_oE~!.lt~j.n.g t ()
so_tar thermodynamic electric power generation, c1QGures of life
8upportsystems, and automation, are pursuc.<!_. Additional benefits
c~~idaccrue from using independent resea~ch and development work by
contractors funded by the Department of Defense and from creatinf a
plan for an integrated technology development program that relates
3technology developmentl for the initial atation to those for the
evolving, more vera.tile station.
The committee consid~r. onboard mission control possible and
deairable and onboard maintenance capabil ity required. NASA has
propoeed to use development hardware 8S operat~onAl equipme"t on the
station to reduce coats. The cOllr.littee. believes this is possible b,At
that the proposal requires careful analysis. The committee has some
concern about cost definition. asaessmcnt and control, and management
.ystem complexity.
The i ••ue$ and the committee'. recommendations are summarized
here. The more significant are designated by solid circles <.).
However. all of the following issues and other. discussed in the
report warrant special consideration by NASA program management.
Technical issue.: the cmnmittee recommends that NASA
• accelerate the development of a solar thennodynamic elec:tri<:_~wer
system fo assess whether th is technology .c_oul~ llupwrt",tJ)~.initial
space stat ian. Concurrently. NASA should devel;;j) -anintegrat8d-
plan for converting the station from photovoltaic to solar thermo-
dyna~ic wwer. This action would minimize the complexity a~d-cost
of increasing the generating capacity as the station's missions
multiply. The ..~ffects of rotating macbines ()!1 thestringel"lt
point ing requirements of the space station, however-~must be
carefully examined.
• continue to develop a control system that is stable under a wide
range of conditions and provides active or passive ways to damp the
vibration of appendages on the structural stack of the evolving
station. Ground-based analyses and simulations cannot adequately
predict the dynamic re~ponse of large flexible structures in space.
Control logic will probably have to be adjusted in actual operation,
which will require measuring responses in space and an adaptable
control and stabilization system.
• achieve a significant measure of life support system closure for
initial operations, using the state of the art. A reas~nable degree
of water and oxygen recycling will reduce resupply requirements and
associated costs of operational suppor' and crew time.
o support the development of technolop,y to allow early incorporation
of hydrogen-oxygen thrusters for control, stabilization, and orbit
adjustment. Although hydrogen and oxygen require long-term cryo-
genic storage, they are less polluting than organic fuel. Hydrogen
and oxygen are nontoxic. noncorrosive chemicals already in use on
the space station.
o reexamine activity in advanced development of communications.
Existing technology is capable of handling almost all projected
11{I{,/
1""'"• bec~r.n,~, ~am,i.li~r wi th and userescli rch an~,,~.t:,:!~.!9.-2.~e.!!L,P!.Q,g,t:AmS,~'8UP- I
ported by the Defense Department that are, pertinent to thespacf,! i'
station definitlori"4'nd"<Jevelopmeni'pr'ogram."'n;{s action will \;~'lp y
ensurel:he early application of importdnt technology developments
at minimum cost.
4
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requirements for the initial stRtion. Funds used for advanced
development of communications may he bettec invested in areas where
technology is not as developed.
define procedures and safety requirements for extra-vehicular
activity missions, designate performance bounds and design
constraints, lind provide suits that require no preconditioninR
(pccbrtHlthinst) before they are put on. These actions will allow
safer, more responsive extra-vehicular activity.
pursue research on microfiltration, the control of baeteriological
matter and t.he identification of microbial buildup in closed, in-
habited space statio~ units. This knowledge is critical to long
missions or emergency operations with an enlarged crew. Control of
contAmination is also important for the design of modules for plant
and animal experiments onboard the space station.
use existing technology where possible, for example in control- )'
moment gyros and wind-unwind joints where fluid or electric power )
are to be tranafered. Unless new developments are required to /
accomplish It task, the use of proven technoloGY will reduce time
and resource requirements as well as technical risk.
creat,~, plans t~at,t~late techno logy deve lop~,n~ .p!:QAr.,.m$.JQJ:_the
initiaistatio'n to evolving requirements. PeriOdicallY updat~d,
these plans will help focus supporting developments and avoid
design commitments that could make modifications to'the station
impossible or very expensive. Th~ plans will also help identify
the technology developmen.:s with high potential value for station
growth.
Policy issues: the committee recommends that NASA
centralize mission control functions on the space station to mini-
mize the need for support from ground-based command and control.
Onboard responses to emergencies should be quicker, and the need
for ground-based operational support for routine operations should
be less, reducing costs. '
design for onboard maintenance, including the detection of system
malfunctions and assessments of corrective action. NASA should
also define maintenance and lC'gistics requirements. This infor-
mation is needed early so that it can be considered when systems,
subsystems, and components are designed and when operations are
planned.
?
..
~~
~
5o determine beforehand the requirements for maintaining ~ajor sub-
systems on the ground for trouble shooting problems arising in
orbit and for systems development to assist ,tation growth. The
plan to fly subsystem hardware previously used in ground t~sting
(protoflights) is sound as long as resources on the ground are
sufficient to support mission malfunction analyses and evolutionary
development.
o consider ca~efully the degree and type of hardware commonality to
pursue. For com~onent8 and possibly subsystems, the use of common
hardware js likely to be beneficial. For mQjor elements, where
performan~e, operations, or other design factors are more important,
a requirement for commonality will be counterproductive.
• prepare test protocol and instrumentation plans for sYr~em tests in
orbit. Many systems will be mated for the first time in orbit, and
the process should be a natural ?utgrowth of prelaunCh protocol.
Consideration should also be given to judicious use of the instru-
mented space station and its components for validating design and
performance and for assessing problems during assemhly and
operation.
o cons ider the congress ional.!'!.!!n<j.!!!J~Q!l,a_I!!E~.~i9_11.and a3sume leadl'!r-
ship in addressing areas·of automation" applicable to the space
station. However, NASA shvuld not develop automation beyond spacp
station requirements. The work should be fO~lne~ on funct ions that
are repetitive and well understood, especially mission control and
status functions to unload the crew and increase time for tasks
requiring human judgment.
Managem~nt issues: the committee recommends that NASA
• establish a clear, firm philosophy of design, development, and
operation in which the station is a standard facility providing a
basic support like a utility. The space station should not be
designed to accommodate every requitement of a user or mission.
Users should provide any unique equipment they need to accommod~te
to the bdsic services.
• decide now on a philosophy and key measures related to significant
cost, schedule, and performance faclors for the program. Firm
specifications will provide a consistent set of guidelines for the
many program participants and reduce the complexity of the effort
to engineer and integrate the system.
• reaffirm the commitment to the concept of designing to cost and be
more explicit in defining the terms of reference for its implementa-
tion. If design-to-cos, is to be a program constraint, cost targets
need to be identified for major systems and elements and a con~on
basis for costing identified.
\
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• uVle" the aUt-fl_nta 01\ and cmlII1I&t!l\ll4lnt. to tHo-cyc1.-eoat INh
and cMtrol", to ...... , th'!!'ir IIr:>t'oprtatt,otuHII 4,.,1 uufulr;",.. tt
thCll Ci)M.pl of lif.,-tyde cost i. to be f.t.in~d•• tC',.. IU('t't a •
...n""UI I "P'fl'r4t iI~ catC" tlHlt ,t'?uunta thi, ('ott alto"l' b., d;"Ufti.td
.0 thlt tho c~.t can b~ unJ~r4tood and calculat"d. A .t.t~~nc
chllt "A~ vill I!U Hh-cydtt c",U for J'l,O,lU- )udRlMnte ~. ",ot
.~.HidBnt. :jpedtic id~I'lfi,fi(.tl"l\ of ,"uidflliM' ttlf tution lifo
and co.tint Ar~ r~qu,r*d for ~.~inlt~l c~.,ativ. P~fto~ftC.
anal :Utu.
• ~.t.bli.h •• intl. offie. f~r c~trotli"1 and di,.~tin~ tke p~.r••
with r~Ad1 .cc~•• to th. NASA arle(ni.tr&tor ~~n r*~uif~d. ~.ch
focu.int of rr'N:U'" ."', C\lntnct flt.Mle-..... nt ~r.:! of t(',hnlea' ,",-
thorhy vUI ¥tro",ilf" til!lNlh f~p/)'til'llt CI1;j dir"",dl\I\ ."If proyi~CI a
dun., Un.. fit f ....~n.ibHit., atlod Jhtthotity. Thill action 'lilt .urlp
n4k@ rn)lr.a ~"4~~~nt, control, and r.portina to h'&hor-l.~t
&"thortty f!llI)f. etH~('tiv~.
• ",vitlV thf! pro"""ud rfOU·<1uf. to control d~AnlJ:.' vlth • vi"" to
\i.itinJ dClc'.ion o~." flov path •• and c~~l~.ity. NASA .hould
dovolop a prot~dof. thlt is (!~.f. con.iatont. and incol~r.nt of
unn~.ded ch.n~~. tAtftl pr~('~'l~' of f@V'." and ap,r.ovat 441
canfu.ion, ti~, .nd co.t ta th~ proar.~
• continue to .~~k lor~iRn r_rcicipation and h.lp ~1~lYe the ••curity
probl~. th.t rf~v~nt ~~f~n•• n~v~rt~nt r4rtici~.tio, in t~o .poe.
aUt ion Pf'OllIf41lll. Pr..lana put it i ~.t ion by both fo,..,iltn troup••nd
th. not."c. O~~.rt~nt i. con*idcr~d i~rt8nt to th~ i"t~r~.t. of
th~ nation. A~propri~t. ua. of th•• ~~~~ otation b1 both "itl
.axi.l:. b~"~fits ff~~ 4n ibport4nt n4tiOft3t •••~t.
• advise th. ~'en.o D~p4rt~nt of Actions rel.t~ to the atc~a­
tion of cla.5ifl~d d~f~nl. ~.~ri..nt. and prepare to i"ifi.t~
action to inyolve thep dOP4rt~nt in the .~ce .tation dt'finition
effort. ineludift~ p~~4n~nt r~?~'~fttation in NASA wbile the n&tion-
41 policy Oft DOn invol~nt in th~ pro~r&m i. btl'in& re.ol~d.
Active OOD participation viii de~nd on the ahility to acco.-odate
and safeRuard defense proj~et.. Dir~ct particip4tion in pro~r&c
dt'finition by rt'sponsible 000 r~pr~.entatiYe. should help eneur.
effective utilization of re50Uf~es.
.. F"', !<\ 'i>
1
Intro(luction
HISTORICAL !AC~CaOUMD
The "at ion.. l A.. ron4ut in and SNCtt Alhainiatnt ion (NASA) hu lifO..n
concerned vith C4nn~d .~.c. Itationo aince the ~arl1 19601. ~ny
etudi•• of .tAt ion U'It, d.. h~n, opt-ratte-no ond erev requir••nt. have
b.pn 'und.d by the og.ncy and other••* Ind.*d, .. asnned 'PACO .tation
V41 (onaid.rttd the 10.i.e41 progrAe to follow Project H~rcury, tho
farat U.S••anned ,pac. fli,8ht .ffort in th. 1960,. P~~je(t ~reury
c.rritd _ oin.lo A.tron4ut. it V4. followed b1 pro)_ct. c..in! (e~v
of tvo, tvo ~~k. in orbit, and r@ndtllVOUI .i.,iona) and Apollo (c~v
of thre_, two crev ~.ber. to the lunar .urt.~e).
Whilo sa}or attention &nd effort va. di.r~cted ot th. nann@d lunar
.iuion throuJth th. 19"Os. the topic of _pace st4t io" "'flair-" and UAe
cont i"utod to receive 4ttCI"lt ion. Thi. It'd to • IIltrie. of NASA space
.ration stud i •• in 1969.
tn the ~arly 1970•• NASA d~veloPtd • Ii.ited space station. Sky lab
(crev of three). U.in~ Apollo spacecraft Bnd launch vtihicl~
C'oapon~nt. and th. Apollo .pacecraft to ferry the crev to and from the
atation. Skylab va. launched in Hay 197). It perfo~d three stparate
••nned .i,siona of 28. S9. and 84 day.. Hanned operations t~rmin~ted
in early 1974. and Sky lab eventually reentered the Earth·, atnoophere
and Was destroyed.
A decision to develop a space shuttle vas aade in lq73. It vas
noc:ogniz:ed that a space transportation .yst". vas required for a space
atation. should one be developed. The Shuttle flev its first orbital
.is,ion vith a crev of two in 1981; it i. nov capable of hardling 4
crev of .evell.
*Space Stations: A Historical Perspective. J. H. Lo~sdon. National
Air and Space Huseu~. Washington. D.C.; Space Station Policy. Planning
and Utili~.tion. AlAA/NASA Symposiun. 1983; and selected papers
(Appendix A>.
"·f~
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To luprort ren;/!'wd interest in a Ipa'. a::ation, PlASA C!ltabliehed the
S~C~ Station T•• k Forc~ in 1931 and dlr.(t~d it to id~nt,fy pro~r••
conc4'pta throulth a",,1)'s4u of lI!iulon rtrquirellllOntl, confill.lfationl and
flyttC">'JIIl, U(hrH.I()~,. devete.pal'!nu and ntuHh, And rul'l4itlHNnt and .,qui.i-
tion approachea. Th~ conc~pt ot th~ epAc. Itation evolY~d (roe this
vor~ (I~O Pi~ur. I-I). figure 1-2 illultr4te. the .tatian's infra-
.truetu,.. Ttt" (unctional el~...ntl of the .pact' .ta~ion include
Labor4tory(.) «(or Ici~nc~, application., and t.chnolo~y)
"'e'fUllNtt otHU!fvatory( I> (.pAe" lind «'Arth)
Tun.portation (cr.-v••Ut~6n .. '~lIAt!fltl, and lojtiuicI)
Scrvidl'll1: hdHtv (f\H fr~., fty",n And pl.t(onu)
C~)"H'I iCAt hHII Ali" dlH.lt prQ': ..... ina
"4nuf.cturin~ f4cllityC.) (d~velcp~nt And production)
Au"l!l!Jly f.ldlity(s)
Storau d(ljNd.)
Th~ -ainr ~Ie~nta of th. ,p.c~ ~t.tion would be ~rm.n.nt.
habiteble. and .ut~tcdDOdul.s 1ft lov e.rth orbit. Th~re would be
one or mor~ .ut~tod fr••-flyinl platfor=. «(or c~rci.l. aprlica-
tion, And lKl.ntific world opcr3ting near the aut ion. The .ution
would .~r~ •• h.~itat, utility core. laboratory. and .~rvic~ etation.
The Shuttl~ wauld earry the compon~nt. into orbit. hftlp .Isemhle the
atation, and a~rvice it on a nominal ~Oda1 cycle vith fresh crevg,
.uppli~s, 4nd equi~nt. Tr~nsport.tion bet~en the atation and tn.
free-flying platfo~. would h~ provided by an autoaated
Qpace tUI, the oroltal man~uvtrina vehicle.
The inlti41 atation io ~nvi5ion~d to h4ve a cr~ of .i. to eiRht
and a pover lev~l of ab~~t 7S kW. Eventually, it would become the
operations base for an orbitel tran,fer vehicl. capable of
transporting payloads to hi~h earth orbits. For platforml operating
in petar orbitw, th~ orbital maneuvering vehicle would operate from
the Shuttle flying in pot~r orbit.
The proRr•• concept was approved for detailed study and preli~inary
.~cification by Pre!idcnt Reagan in early 1984. An artist'. drawing
of an initial station, to be opeutional in 1991 or 1992, it shown it.
figure 1-).
The initial space station is expected to operate in an inclined
orbit of ~bout 280 with unmanned coorbiting platforms. The
station'. capabilities are expected to g~ov through modifications and
additions to accommodate a crew of 12 to 18 an1 to generate about 300
kW of electric poller by the y~ar 2000. Figure 1-4 shows A pouible
future 6tatioo. Just what the system viII look like in it. initial
and expanded cOltfigurations i. not yet certain. The configut"f,tion
selected for detailed design viII ~volve fra. further in-house and
contracted studies.
GROWTH ELEMENTS
FIGURE 1-1 Space station clust~r concept.
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FIGURE 1.-2 Space station infrastructure.
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ASEB INVOLVEMENT
In November 1982, NASA'. Office of Aeronautic. and Space Technology
(OAST) inttiated dilcuuiona with the Aeronautic. and Space Engineering
Board (AS~8) on apace atation technology program planning. At.
meeting of the board in Harch 1983, various delisn and deve1opl!tcnt
qUell iont wre raited by OAST to which the ASI;B rupondfid. Following
• gent'ral dialoguo on the subject at a June 1983 ASEB meeting, NASA
concluded that the overview procca. was of value and uhould continue.
Of interut were the direction of the .pace .tatlon program and the
technologit'a thAt needed to be developed, However, no 4Cllon WIU
taken on the matter at thAt tir:1O.
Committee Charge and Activity
Laa-in_l9.t!), with the strong possibility that the space atation
would move from general study to deaign and hardw<irt? dcvrt'loptllCnt, IlASA,
through OAST and ita new Space Station Task force, requested the AS~a
to conduct a more thorough review of the progr4m, conc~ntrating on
plana for engineering and technology devtllopmant. In reapons~ the
ASE~ fo~d the_l::Q~i.!E.!!!.y.n.~eace.fi~ollti(m.E"8i.n~~ri.~~and l"echnology
D~t, which wa. approved by the National Reseafch ~ouncil on
Harch 15. 1964.
The cOllllllittee'. major function waa identified 418 the review of on-
going and planned NAl:lA programs for reaearch and technology development
and of engineering approaches to the evolving pro~rllm. The review W48
to consider
technology for support of an initial station;
an enhanced technology program that would support a more advanced
space station;
on-orbit maintenance;
technology pertinent to the long-term evolution of the station; and
the nature of research and technology development to be conducted
in apace and of related R&T facilities.*
Initially, the committee organized two panels, one concentrated on
technical areas assigned to the Harshall Space Fl ight Center (HSFC)
and associated NASA centers and the other assigned to the work of the
Johnson Space Center (JSC) and associated NASA centers. Later, three
other panels were formed to address thetechnolo&y of llo1a'r"tiie'r~o=--'
dynariilcelectric'power gencrationandprogram and lllanage';;ent issues.
The members of these panels are listed in Appendix 8.
*500n after the study was under way it became evident that it was
premature to consider this subject in detail, thus the committee did
not address the subject of in-space R6T.
\.
... ' ~. ..
------------_ _- .
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The cOmillitte~ held three lIlI!l!lting. and the panela held one meeting
each. The firlt meeting of the committee va. devoted to orRanization,
the development of informstion, and a preliminary identifieation of
i.lue.. The second meeting val a review of panel finding. and a pre-
liminary identification of the committee'. prosr•• finding.. The final
meeting was a vorkshop in which NASA provided the cOftl'IlIittee updated
info~tion on the .tatu. of selected developments in technology and
the .tatus and .ubstance of NASA'. apace .tatian definition and requeat
for proposal. on concept definition and preliminary design (Phase B).
In addition, the committee discu••ed critical technical policy and
management i.lues related to the program and rleveloped the final
working draft of thi. report.
Appendix C lists the subjects and NASA pre.enters for each of the
aeetingl of the committee and its panell.
THIS REPORT
The findings of the committee, based on material. presented, and
diecur.siona held, are the subject of thi. report. The report itt
expected to be one of a series of studies requested by NASA for con-
tinued ASES review of its space station engineering and technology
development effort.
The committee conduct~d ita study during 8 dynamic period. Many
progra. matters were being reaolved--organization and manageNent,
mi.sion models, nystem descriptions and specifications, selection of
preferred configurations, relations betveen NASA and industry, and
preparation of the request for induatry proposals for concept analysis
and preliminary design. Both NASA and the ASER understood this situa-
tion before the study was begun; the fluidity W~8 considered an asset
because it vould allow time for the findings to affect program
formulation.
Hany key engineering and technology decisions are yet to be made.
The committee believes that some of the issues reported here will be
resolved in the normal course of program development; other. may veIl
require special action by NASA.
'..
. ... ...._ • ..- , • • __cA__ ~ .
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Current Program Plan
PLANS AND COSTS
The .pac~ station program. approved by the President and ConRres.
for initial .tudy. is estimated to cost some $8 billion for design.
development. and flight of an initial ststion in the 1991-1992 time
period. With growth and related infrastructure development. the
program i. projected to cost some i20 Lillion to the year 2000.
Launch. support. and operational costs are not included in these
estimates. In addition, the costs of payloads and their support
requirements and the contribution of other countries being encouraged
to take active roles in the program are not included.
The space station program is to pursue these objectives: a per-
manent manned presence on orbit, 8 manned capability for conducting
science and studies of the earth's environment from orbit. utilization
and commercialization of the space environment for research and
technology and product development and production. enhancing space
exploration capability. and providing growth capability for the
station itself.
In pursuit of these objectives. the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) has identified and implemented generic and
focused technology development programs in FY 1984. Extended plans
are in development for FY 1985 and beyond. Studies of major station
elements and components are under ~ay. In addition, effort directed
at Phase B (concept definition and preliminary design) was initiated
with the releage of the Phase B request for proposals (RFP) to
industry in September 1984.
The RF? calls for a 9-month definition effort, starting in early
1985, followed by a 9-month preliminary design activity. The Phase C/O
(final design, development, and production) effort is scheduled to
start in 1987. Present plans call for a preliminary design review in
1988, a critical design review in 1989, and first flight of station
elements in 1991. The initial operating configuration (IOC) would be
assembled and in operation hy 1992.
15
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Funding for the study phase of the program is $150 million in FY
1985 and projected to be $280 million in FY 1986 and $250 million in
FY 1987.
ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS
The NASA organization responsible for definition and implementation
of the pro~t'I.lm consists of a Space Stat ion Office at NASA Headquarters
(Level A), a Space Station Program Office (L~vel B) at the NASA Johnson
Space Center, and program support groups (Level C) at various NASA
field centers. Level A is responsible for top-level policy, funding,
and authori7.ation activities, and Level B, for overall technical
manaRement of the program including systems engineering and integration
(SE&I). There will be no industry prime contractor. Level 8, the
technical management office, will act as the prime contractor for the
effort. This office will be described in more detail in the following
section of the report. I.evel C activity, called work packages, 18
divided amonR the field centers, Figure 2-1, and is outlined in the
following section, Program Development. The centers will be responsi-
ble for contracting for. work in their assigned areas of responsibility
and interface with and support the Level B and other Level C activity
in their areas of technical specialty.
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
The conceptual design of the space station, at the time of this
review, was being defined in-house, and NASA field centers program
assignments had b~en made (Figure 2-1) and included:
Johnson Space Center USC): JSC's responsibilities include definition
and desi~l of the structure to which the elements of the space station
will be attached and installation and integration of systems on the
structure. JSC is also responsible for interfaces between the space
station and the Shuttle and for station assembly, attitude control,
thermal control, communications, data management, life support systems,
And equipping of the habitability module for crew ward room and galley.
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC): Definition and design of common
pressurized, inhabitable modules for laboratories, habitation, opera-
tions, and logistics is the responsihility of MSFC. The common modules
will have provisions for data distribution, power, themlal control, and
communications. Other responsibilities include onboard environmental
control, the propulsive systems for the orbital maneuvering vehicle,
and equipping of laboratory and logistic modules.
Lewis Research Center (LeRC): Definition and design of the electrical
power generation, co~ditionin~, and storage systems is LeRC's
respons ibi lity.
"I
llP-O I-MS'C
• SEU Support
- ECLSS .nalyli.
- LoRiltic. 8nllysi.
- OM.... /OTV interf..ce 8n.. lylil
- C"""""n lMdule
Coamonllity In.. IYli.
- l'ropullion an.. ly.i.
- Re~olt .n.lysi.
- Labor8tory a~.ly.i.
H.r~v.re/Softu.re
• C"""",,n module
- St"Je:tur~
- Diatribution for:
OMS
Pow..r
EClSS
'1'1",,,,,,,,1
r.oft:lun iC'at ions
• EeLS sy.te..
• Propulsion .yst~
• l.bor.tory module outfitting (I)
• lORiatie. module outfitting
<2 or 1)
• ~/OTV .ee~od.tions
• Applieation••oftw.re
llP-{l2-JSC
• SEU Support
- Crowth .~.Iy.l.
n.t .. ~~~A~nt .y.t~ analy.i.
C~nie.tion./tr.ckin_.n.. I,.i.
load. analysi.
Ther=.. 1 a"aIYsi.
Control ..nalysi.
Ass••bly sequenee definition
STS pro.iaity
Operation.1 berthin_ ..n.ly.i.
CrP.w interf.ea .n.ly.l.
Resouree integr.. tlon ..n.ly.i.
H.rdvRr~/Sortw.r~
• A....~bly .tructure
- Tru••
- Harlul. Interconnect
- Airlock
- STS bert"lng
- po.... r. Ther= •• Cisoh.la
• ManipulatOr!
• R~&ourc., int.Rration
• The .... I cont rol .y.te,.
• EVA .y.tem and .. irlock cutfirrlnc
• Cuid.nc~. n.yisation .nd
eontrol .y.t ....
• C~nie.tion./tr..eking .y.te.
• O.t. m4n.~~~nt .~.t~.
• Habit.r modul. outfittin_
• STS interf.ce
• Applic.tion••oftw.. re
llP-<ll-CSI'C
• SUI Support
- PI.tfona eonflcuratlon aM
c~n.lit, ..n.ly.i.
- 'Iatfonas/••rellit••
.ervicin, anal,lie
- Attaehed p.yload...nal,.I.
- laboratory ..n.l,.i.
- St.tloR/pl.tfora int.rface
analy.h
ff.,rriW'oN'/S()ftv.~
• PI.tto .....
• Att.ehed I'.yloarl acc~.. tlon.
• Plat fo ... and r.....-f1yer
••rvicin~ 8ce~.. tion.
• llbor.tory eodul. ourfitrin& (1)
• Appllc.t io"••ort...r.
W'l'-~-tdC
• SUI Supporr
- P~r .yst.. a~l,.I.
N.rdw.r.!So'tv.~
• ~r .yst ...
- CPnf'r.r len
- Co,,,lit loni ...
- Stou/le
• Applie ..tion••oft......
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MOTE: The upper portion depicr. the support in...n.. ly.l. work ..nd rhe lover portion identifi•••ctual .nd-it.. d.liver.ble. in Ph... C/D.
Both portion. eonltitute a let of wP (work p..ckl«e) re.~onlibilitie. for th. Definition and Pr@liminary o..ilft Ph••••
FIGURE 2-1 Work package summary definition.
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REFERENCE CONF1GURATION
;,.
x
x
x
300 kW
3DO kW+
Growth
x
x
x
lOC
75 kW
75 kW+
Power to bus
Heat rejection
8alance/controllability (normal
and degraded modes)
Simultaneous viewing of earth, space
solar. and stellar payloads
Scientific airlock and windows wi;h
earth, solar. and stellar viewing
Kennedy Space Center (K~C): Definit~.on Rnd design in support of
preflight and launch operations and logistic-support activities are
KSC responsibilities.
JSC, HSFC, and LeRC responsibilities include the develop~nt of
test beds to llssist in the acceleration of major component and
subsystem technology development and eventually for flight hardware
design and development support and flight readiness testing. The
actual fliRht system desiRn, development, and test work will be
carried out by contractors. Figure 2-2 identifies these test bed
program assignments.
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC): GSFC is responsible for the
definition and de8i~ of the automated free-flying platforms and the
service. maintenance, and repair of these and other free-flyin~
spacecraft. In addition, the definition and development of payloads
to be attached internally and externally to the space station and the
outfitting of pressurized modules for science and applications is to
be handled by this center.
The Langley Research Center (LaRC) has been given the task of
working with the JSC Space Station Program Office to help define the
growth station and its advancc-,J techllolo~V development requirements.
Another LaRe assignment is to address and identify design features to
be incorporated in the initial station to facilitate station growth.
NASA has identified a reference space station configuration in its
Phase B RFP. The reference configuration was arrived at through
evaluations of such factors as: control, stahilization, operational
flexibility. and ease of station erection. The candidate configura-
tions, illustrated in Figure 2-3, were selected for detailed examina-
tion considering: IOC cost, maintainability, operations flexibility.
user accommodation, ~rowth, number of Shuttle launches. life-cycle
costs, and complexity. As a result of analysis, the power tower,
described in more detail in Appendix D. was selected as the Phase 8
lOC reference configuration with the following projected capabilities:
'..
_.... - . _.-...__._-------.:.__ .... _.-
'.
I •
Lead
Teat Bed System Center Core Team Support
-
Data management JSC ARC, eSFC, JPT..
KSC, LaRC,
HSFC, NS~,
Regenerative life support HSFr ARC, JSC
Power LeRC JSC, MSFC JPL
Thermal management JSC GSFC, LeRC, HSFC
Attiturle control and
stabil ization JSC HSFC, 3PT..
Auxiliary propulsion MSFC JSC, LeRC, JPL LaRC
Space operations, mechanisms JSC MSFC, LeRC, JPL LaRe
I
JPL - Jet Propulsion Laboratory
ARC - Ames Research Center
NSTL - National Space Technology Laboratories
Abt. 10 kW Abt. 20-25 kW
Growth
x X
X X
X
X
Abt. 10 kW Abt. 20-25 kW
loe
\ :;;.
FIGURE 2-2 Test bed program assignments.
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Large structures ~onstruction and
payloads/platforms servicing
Tethering of spacecraft
-- Orbital transfer vehicle basing
Growth elements
Polar platform (commonality with SS)
Co-orbiting platform (commonality
with SS)
fICURE 2-1 C.lndidate concepts anft their principal characterirttics.
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x
x
Plnolir
AII'd i cf4 f(~ COIle ~I'tr: Ii
___ 'i ...__..
Solar Arrav~~
• Fixed
• 'i.~d. tilt3~le
• Ci .billed
Sr nlc t re
--.--~ dule-to-r·,odu!e
• Tnl/Is spine
• LarRe area truss
Orientllt ion
-.1:arrh- fixed
• Quui-inen illl
• 8<'lth
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Program Status
To pl.c. th~ trudy findin~. in p~r.~cti~, 4 bri.t ov.rvl~v of
.~I~C(ftd infon.ation provid~d to th~ ad hoc r.~itt •• hy National
Aoro"autiu and St\lc. Meinittution (HASA) pralu. unagorl it
pr_.ont~d h~ro with c~itt.e eo~nt.ry ba.ctd on tho pr~••nt.tion
uteri.l CApiHtndi. C) ..nit COtlil&i.ttffO del ib..,r3riona. Addn..~d 4t'.
t~ehnololt." d@v.lopMnt, un, NqtJircH~nt•• l!Iliuion ctvolution. lyatftl.
.naly•••• ayath' en&in•• rina .nd int~ar"tion, c:untractin*t, and coat,.
Tho 4n.lytical vork to dote on .uth m4tt~r, as structural confi,ura-
tio"••~ dyn4... ics, th~rRal control, end lif. eupport indicate. that
aro•• An.lyrical tool. are in h.nd, but retinem0nt in tom. arc.., i.
rtquir~d for hi&her confidence in the 4n4lye~#.
SPIce sUtion .l~ctric pcvttr g~n.ution .tudi~. have .ddrt'....d lohr
photovoltaic, .nC'rgy 8torag(!, sohr th0m.:')&yn<lll!!lie, and nlld.,ar electric
power generation .ysteal and Irlte. trade.. Initial studies show .olar
ther.~tyna.ie (Rankine, Brayton, or Stirli~g) followed by lolar aodul.r
CCaAs concentrating) 'Y5t~ to be aore prONiting than conv0ntional
photovolraic .y.t~. for the initi.1 oper.tin~ canfiRuration (IOC). but
particularly for the growth station. The solar the~yn••ic ayste.
i. of special interest b~au8e of siRnificant reduction. in projected
area and obscuration, direct generation of alternating current. and
Dare efficient operation, Hovever. until recently NASA'. prORra.
nanager. did not support 4Rgressive technology develo~nt due to the
asselsed technical development ftc~edule risk. for lOCo Nuclear Catatic
thermionic) .y.te~. could be of interelt in the long terA, but environ-
aental and political i.'ues constrain ,erioul consideration for th«
8tation. However. the Department of Defense and NASA are pur,uin~
technical development of nuclear systems for space pover generation.
albeit of t~o large a .ize.
It is reasonahly certain that hard docking will be avoided.
Berthing (soft doeking) concepts have not been examined in detail but
21
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viII b. uled. Hodel t •• ta viiI develop an appreciation for d.siRft and
operational problrea ~nd help id~ntify d~king hardware comNOnality
b~t~.n operatina ele~nta of the atation.
AutOQAtion .n~ autonomy viII be uled to au~~ent crfv capAbility
through an appropriate balance betvfcn the crev'. hiRher ord~r ,kill.
and autOmAt ian. The l~yel of autonOfty for IOC i. not ex~ct~d to be
R~at but viiI build up vith ti.-.
Th. pr~••nt ~i•• inn -odel calla for a large amount of fluid
tfan.f~r and handlinR fr08 th~ ~round Co the .cation and the .tation
to frflft-flyinA orbitAl tranlh-r vehicle.. Fluid tran.f~r _chan'u-
tion. fll"t' ... ur~llI(!nt. contalllln"ti"n ... "ai,iAnce. lind aafety .or. important
technical dev~lop~nt•• A _P3~~ fliRht .x~ri~nt on th~ Shuttle to
.tudy th••• problrM' ia plAnned for the 1988-1989 ti.. period. The
data (~ lato for initiation of the hardw.r~ develo~nt prograe, hut
are phA••d to .upport the orbital transfer vehicl~.. Funding ha.
con,trained tho .(hedul~, vhich ,. nov difficult to accelerate.
Thft~l control tcchnoloRY d0v~10~nt for tvo ph••• heat pi~. ha.
progr." ••d far .nou~h to Allow thi, type of hut rejection pyatt". to
be developed for the IOC. Sh~ttl. fliRht .xp~ri~nt. viii be run to
validate tho conct'pt in the lQ8S to 1988 ti~ period.
Fint and second generation lif~ support ayatt>tlt developments can be
.caled to th~ .ize required for the spAce .tation. A test bed pragr.a,
operated concurrently vith Phase B work, viii provide desiRn d~ta for
the Phase C/D (finat de.i~/con.tructionand operation.) effort. The
llr~ support area does not present difficult l'5ue.. However, .ignifi-
cant ft'duct ion. in fl" id aupp 1y and c rev support for fi lit rat ion 8y8te•
•• intenanee can be reatizt'd throu~h partial cloeing of fluid and gae
loop. and autoaating subsystem m4naRement.
Space suit probleas are: ease of initiation and termination of
extra vehicular ~ctivity; closing the life support system to reduce
external contasination; improve=ent of hand aanipulation: and opera-
tional flexibility includi"K onboard maintenance, repair, and resupply.
Thi. later require~nt is nev and important frca logistics and re.upply
considerations.
Human productivity contributes to the effectiveness of the kind. of
aissions and lengths of stay time (90 days) planned for the .pace
atation. Studies considering the complete spectrum of anticipated crew
activity--internal and external vehicular activity, machine interface,
food. habitation. and 8upport--are included in the technolo~y progralll.
Special attention mult be given to medical and psychological factor ••
Guidelines. Itandard~, and requirements for crew-machine inteRra-
tion exist. However. '<.:hey need to be upgraded for the space station.
Plana call for this to be accomplished in FY 1985, in time to support
I
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Phale 8 definition and design .ffo~t. A related te.t bed activit1
will .upport guideline and hardvare development and crev trainin&.
Thflre .,11 no ailitnificAnt technolo~ie" conlHrainti in the areAl of
life .upport. habitation. and hu~n relationl that cannot be ••tiofied
with te(hnoloRY develo~nt.
Data m.n.Re~nt .y.t•• etudi~o are und~r way within NASA and at
contractor.. The B4jor technology i ••un. relate to intearation.
~rific.tion. and fAult tol.rAnee capability. AI veil AI ataticn
mai~tain.bility and .ervicability. It i. eatieated that there viII be
.b~'Ut a 26 ~~Abit capacity in the data ,yate•• Hal! of the c.pactty
will be u.ed (or llll.anftgeftlCnt funetione and the athftr half for applica-
tion functinn.. Th_re ore no t0chnicat anov stoppor. in thi. 8r~••
However. techno lORY advance. can provide improvt~nt. in data .Ylte.
perfaraane@. apeed ••nd operational flo_ibility. A •• t of .y_t~
de.iEn aUldelinea would ••• i.t in the focusiog of new developments.
A dhtributed data .yltea with c~n/.t.ndud int,ntAee unit. is
planned to handle the complex data flow on the apace .tetian for
management of operational a. ~lt A' uler data. 1be.e unit. viti
allow the di.tributed ••~ci.1 function unit. to c~nie.te and
indopendently dieplay d*ta. Sp~ciot function unit. viiI be used to
handle cem.and. and pal' through data to control .tationa.
The concept i. to provide common service. to all el.~otl of the
.pace .tetion. tech data generator will have it. own (diatributed)
.y.telll and aoftvare that t iea into the data distrihut ion .y.te••
NASA ptan. to procure major Iyatem ooftvare el~nta froa vendors
and perform the .Ylt~. loftvare inte~r.tion tAlk in-ho~$e.
A te.t bed i. con.idered critical to the development. operfttional
lupport. and training ••sociated with the data management ayatea and
i. being develo~d by NASA.
Hoat of the comnunication system requirements identified are
e ••entially vi thin the state-of-the-art. Proposed technology
development work reflecto far-out need.. The committee doe. not
consider the work to be of immediate value to the etation.
USER REQUIREHEh~S
Space station miasions have been under study for several years.
Some missions represent active (funded) progra~a. others just concepts.
These mission studies have been used to scope space station operation
and support requirements.
The .i•• ion requirements thus obt~ined are known to be overstated,
but are used by NASA to allow for accommodation of future international
and commercial payloads.
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81 late o"..or of 1~84, OCllllttt III lI1i .. lone and ISS unique .upport
p.ra..t~ro had b~.n identified, i.e., ~r (levelo and duration),
weight. volu••• and &upport eervicee. The•• data allowed development
of o~r.tionAI and functional Dcen.rio. and related etation and crew
.upport requirements. lioweve'r, tn••iuion. identified are not
approved by NASA or the u.er e~nity.
Bec.u.e the .illiono (payloado) contllin unknown., the philoDophy
(oll~d io to deaiwn for g~ner.l .ce~dation, not .pecific payload
requireaent.. Inai8ht into paylo&d requir~nt. 1. providod through
.xten,iye contract activity ~nd contactA bet~en NASA .nd u.er Aroup••
The Lan~l.y Reae4feh Center hal the t~.k of developing and ~aint.inin~
tho .l6lion lIl~el and int@Rr.tir.g and definin~ paylOAd .cc~dation
and Rupport r~quire8entl. The NASA Orrie. of Space Science. and
Application. hal al~o ~ount~d a special advisory .ffort to explicitly
identify mi •• ion. and support requirceent. in the .cienco. and
applic.tion••r••••
MISSION EVOLUTION
The Lanale, Research C~nter update. the .i•• ion Radel ev••y'few
.ontha. n,. Godel eonsiets of individu41 payload. grou~d into aiaeion
seta by com=on .upport and .ervice requir.menta, i.e., apace. weight,
tiae, extra vehicular activity (EVA), pOWC"r, and other .upport re-
quireeenta and intClRrate. them to represent rea.on"ble, achievable
operational capubility. The model had not been exp4nded to include
international and commercial mia.ion. at the ti~ of this review.
StudieD to develop the definition of laboratory NOdulee for life
science, materials, and research And technology development (R&T)
activity in apace are planned. Although most of the projected .vece
R&T work has been generated within NASA nod reflect. university and
industry interests, there Arc efforts ongoing to iMProve the R&T wadel.
The space station program operating/growth scenario i8 projected to
be: IOC, the addition of international payload., the addition of
commercial payloads, then growth in capability and services. The
initial foreiK" involvement in the epace station i. asse.sed to be in
the period between the IOC in 1992 and the year 2000.
SYSTEMS ANALYSES Ah~ DESICN
The general rule is that technology for the IDe be ready (or
full-scale development by 1987 to ensure that the technolo~y selected
for Phase C/O will be qualified for an operational 1991-1992 station.
The critical technolo~iea have been identified through NASA-supported
mis.ion, system, and subsystem studies. However, a firm set of system
sped HCAt ions i 8 ad 11 to be defined and technology deve 10pm1!nt
activity c~ale.ced and focused.
...::
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Becau.e of the early .tate of definition of .i•• ionl, current .pace
.tation program ant' technology development plant represent best
eltimate., not plana bal~d on firm Iystem .~cification.. The Space
Station Program Office (SSPO), with the Ph.l~ C participant•• ha. tha
reaponeibilit, for developing theee .i•• ion plan. and sy.tea
.pee if icat ion••
The prime .trueture for the apace station i. projected to b~
aluminu.. NASA ,tated that little compoaite material will be need~d
because the Shuttle. with re.pect to apaee thtion "ayload., i. volume
not weight li.ited. In addition, aluminum i. better under~tood and
leu eXPf'n.iv" th"n cOf\lpollitel, althou$th cOlftJ\oaites.re atiffC!r,
lighter weight, and have lover coefficient. of expansion. Compolite•
• ay have their major ule in aecondnry and ~rectAble/extendAbl.
structUntl ~nd can be ~xpected to be u.~d for structural member. of
the larle modul~••
A .. jor de.ign con.ideration i. on-orbit maintenance. both scheduled
and un.choduled. It i. proposed to de.ign for minimum disruption of
noncritical function. and no disruption of critical functions.
Contracted Itudie. addresn not only atAtion deaign but such matters
as the .ervicing of satellittU, conatruction of larll;e structure" and
the de.ign of orbital maneuv~rinK vehicles and orbital transfer
vehicles. TechnoloRY i.sue. and development need. will be id~ntified
in theae contracted .tudies as veil •• in the Phillie B contnctt.
An SSPO objective i. to define. specify. and integrate .11 system
requirement••0 cOBpletely as possible. In this renard, NASA io
taking on more r~!ponsibility than it haa in psst programs. NASA
itself will be the system. integrator and manager. The job is a large
one requiring levels of activity, skills, and people that NASA fflay
find difficult to auemble in-house without significant industrial
.ssistllnce.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION
As noted earlier, the Space Station Task Force that managed the
deflnit ion and request for proposal effort has been replaced with a
pennanent Space Station Office (SSO) at NASA Headquarters, directed by
an Associate Administrator. SSO reports to the Administrator of NASA
and has Level A progra~ responsibility (e.g •• policy, plans, budgets.
and administration and congressional interfaces). Level 8 program
~eponsibility rests with the newly formed Space Station Program
Office (SSPO) located at the Johnson Space Center. This office.
supported by a number of special offices. includes a Systems
Engineering and Integration (SE&I) office. The SSPO and SE&I
organizations are ahown in Figures 3-1 and 3-2.
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A NASA pronrsm director. group, the Management Council, has been
established to advise SOO. The ManaRelftent Council consista of Level A
and 8 prORram director. and the directors of the NASA field centers
involved in the apace station pronram. The L~vel C proRram directors,
at the field center., report to SSPO but are .lao responsible to their
field center director••
SSPO viII inreRrate and control all proRram technical activity.
Sy'tem. en~ineering vill be the responsibility of Level B supported by
Level C center. and their contractors.
Configuration control boards viii control Levels Band C channe
activity at appropriate A, 8, and C program levels.
The program is developing a broad base of new technology and
maturing selected technologies through an advanced development
program. Final substantiation of the newly developed technologies
will be made early in the Phase C design effort.
Program plana down through Level C hardware are being developed to
provide an early aseeslment of schedule and costa. Early cost
projections are high. Cost reduction targets will be identified
through in-house studies of costs for hardwsre design, development,
and testing and through support contractor work that will project
program plnns and cost estimates.
CONTRACTI NG
The 18-month Phase B contracts, to be let by the Level C centers,
have two parts. Within the first 9 months, decisions on baseline
systems and subaystems viII be made. The final 9-month effort will
focus on prel iminary design and technology development in preparation
for the definition of the in-house and contracted Phase C/D final
design, development, construction, test, and operational activity.
The Phase B contractors viII work vith NASA on the development and
application of the technology development (software and hardware) test
beds. Additional NASA-sponsored studies, notably fat a management and
life support studies, support the test bed program ..
The methods for exchange of information between contractors has not )
been identified. The general view is to keep the data within NASA, J\
vith NASA "mixing and matching" Phase B and other contract results and
distributing the data as considered appropriate.
NASA, though generally aware of pertinent Department of Defense
technology, has not actively integrated these data into NASA's program.
, ·~""""""'--_.. _·_-.........w...._..._"....._-·~·~·_-- ,
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COSTS
There is not yet a good cost analysis tied to specific confiRura-
tions and capabilities. Gross costs estimates for apace station
.ystem hardware represent one-fourth of the coat of the lOCo Other
major estimated coats relate to system integration and support.
Cost sensitivity analyses show that it is difficult to reduce space
station costs without major changes in pro~ram capahility or changing
NASA's approach to development and flight qualification. Reducing
capability may not result in large cost savings. The full cost of the
space stAtion program through the year 2000 has not been identified.
The estimates of $8 billion for IOC and $20 billion through the year
2000 are for design and development of the system and do not cover
launch costa, operations, program sup~rt, or payload cost.s.
NASA has concluded that protofliRhting (flying development test
hardware) will reduce program costs in the order of $1.8 billion for
flight hardware procurement and tcating. Care will be needed to
a.sure that the hardvare used for flight is appropriately qualified
and does not require replacement in test beds for the aolving of
flight problems or for further system development work.
Free-flyinR platform system requirements h4ve not been resolved.
Platform cost analyses have progressed but are r.ot fully developed.
It is assumed that platform cost.s can be reduced through the use of
common station systems and subsystems. However, this may not be
possible due to requirement differences.
If the Europeans,. Japanese, or others join the program, their
investment is independent of the U.S. investment. The u.S. program
plan is such that there will be an operational space station even if
there is no foreign involvement.
One complete analysis of costo had been made at the time of this
study and was being examined to identify major cost factors and ways
to reduce costs. Cost reduction actions have been identified and
estimates made of associated cost savings that need careful attention
if the $8 billion limit for tOe is to be realized.
r
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Program ISSlles
The committee, in its review of the engineering and technology
development program for the space station, identified broad technical
and policy factors that warrant National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) prORram management consideration. These iSlues.
related to technical, policy, and management factors, are described in
this section of the report. Recommendations for NASA consideration
are included.
TECHNICAL FACTORS
The committee examined technology issues considered critical to the
development of the initial operating configuration (roc) and the growth
station. Discussed here are technical matters related to: electric
power, control and stabilization, environmental control and life sup-
port. onboard propullion and fluids, communications and tracking, extra
vehicular activity, human productivity, mission operations and station
autonomy, space operations, maintenance, automation and on-orbit
operations, on~oard test instrumentation, biological contamination,
structures, materials, mechanisms, and thermal control.
Electric Power
A key element of the space station is its electric power generating
system. Early desiRns specified photovoltaic arrays and a storage
system of batteries or fuel cells. However, the initial requirement
for 75 kW will grow as the station evolves. The level of electric
power for station growth may approach 300 to 400 kW.
NASA space station studies have addressed electric energy storage
and electric power generation through solar photovoltaic, solar
the~odynamic, and nuclear systems. These studies show that solar
modular-photovoltaic (GsAs concentrating) systems are better than
solar photovoltaic but that solar ther~odynamic (Brayton, Rankine,
and Stirling) systems are more promising for station application,
especially for the long te~.
30
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The solar thermodynamic systems are most promising due to high
system efficiencies; reduced projected area; reduced obscuration of
lines of sight; and simplified power distribution, control, and storage
compared with the photovoltaic syatems. However, the need for research
and technology development and the lack of flight experience create
schedule and program cost ri8ks for IOC application. Therefore, it
would not be prudent to base the IOC design totally on their use.
Fortunately, this decision does not have to be made until 1987, the
date for Phase C design decisions.
To maximize the probability of meeting current IOC cost and schedule
commitments, NASA proposed to be conservative and to use the solar
photovoltaic system for IOC.
The ad hoc committee's panel that reviewed NASA's solar thermo-
dynamic program in August 1984 found that for solar thermodynamic
systems required technical developments are not hiRh risk if advanced
development is funded now. The most difficult prohlem relates to the
solar energy receivers. There is a reasonable probability that the
technology could be developed and applied with little impact on the
IOC date. Because of this potential, NASA h~s identified $18 million
to support technology developmeQt for solar thermodynamic systems.
To help resolve the issue of power system selection, NASA should
quantify the risks for the competitive systems (photovoltaic versus
solar thermodynamic). This selection process, in part, will require
mission studies to address how the systems are assembled, used, and
maintained; how they fail; how failures are identified; and how the
systems are repaired. OJ.le factor of possible concern, nO.teJ{R.lo.r~_4~J?y..
NASA ~_J.s_tl1e level andeffects-,the_ .gYfQ1U:QPJC ~()r<;~~.!lmL "illJ'1l t i,()n,
i~tir_atedby suchsystems, on space station control and point ingpreci-
s ion:'='Mli s' i 88ue-may·'requJ.re--sp]'ce-fl rshtl:!xPl:!ri,~,l'1ti to provide
operii:Tonal design data if str~cturalresponsecharacteristicscannot
be'determined accurately enough before flight.
Mission planning indicates that the space station will need
additional power within a few years after initial operation. The
development of a road map for upgrading the power system from 75 kW,
along with the related work on thermal control, is an essential part
of a successful overall program. In addition to development of a solar
thermodynamic system for the IOC, the road map should address transi-
tion from sohr photovoltaic to sola~r'-tne-rmoaynamic'''8Yste'mfi:'Without
early'analyses and appropriate technolo~y development commitment, it
is not believed that transition will occur with proper time phasing
and minimum cost impact.
The committee recommends that:
• NASA continue vigorous ~olar thermodynamic system technology
development and layout a road map for changeover and/or
initial application of such 4 system as part of the IOC
\
[
32
design and development effort. The agency should proceed to
narrow its electric power generating system options through
technology development, design, hardware test. and trade-off
analyses. and. 88 quickly 8S possible. focus final
design/development to reduce risks and costs.
If the solar thermodynamic system is not ready for IOC. some com-
ponents such as the power system support tnl8S and the central power
tower should be designed to accommoda~e transition. including the
addition of an alternating current power distribution and control
system and oth~r required changes.
Al though nuclear powet: was M.t-.JHscuas.ed....bll the ccnmit.t..e.e..__c.oneern
was....expressed over the factthatt.he~.lIbj~c.L~~!J_.JlQ.tunder_~~.~iy~~.
revieW~----sa'fefy is a serious consideration. but Ftl"e potential benefit.
appear great enough (i.e., space requirp.ments, logistics, reliability.
power levels> to warrant a comprehensive assessment, especially for
the growth station. A decision on the long-term course of action
could follow.
Control and Stabilization
The technology applied to control and stabilization and orbit
maintenance of the space station rests on several decadeR of technolog
development and continued NASA effort on theoretical development.
Desi~ work shows that the size and flexibility of the current space
station concept dictates the need for further t~chnical advances to
satisfy system performance and reliahility. Of particular interest
are automated control and stabilization techniques for application to
practical station arrangements including sensors to be used in angular
orientation and structural deformation and motion control systems.
Obviously, the ~.ontrol system far the roc should be designed to
account for the changing confiRurationof the~spac!:!lIf~tion. a large
flexible ~structure whose mass. mass distribution. and moment charac-
terisFr~s will vary with time. Control concepts and analytical tools.
sensors and actuators. and computer hardware and software are needed
for designing and developing control systems. It is reasonably clear
that the control and damping (active and passive) systems should be
based on adaptive concepts. both discrete and distributed depending on
the dynamic modes to be controlled.
In preliminary control and stabilization analysis. the space statior
structure was assumed to be relatively stiff. There is little questior
that this class of analysis will not be adequate for system desiRn. anc
tht!re is no way to test the full system prior to assembly on orbit.
It would be prudent to have the control and stabilization technology
developed sufficiently to allow a design that has a range of dynamic
responses that can accommodate the probahle range of station
structural flexibility.
, ,
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S~ver~l levels of structural representation a.e desir1ble. A
first-order analysis is needed to provide physical insight int~ vibra-
tion modes without getting involved in large comp~ter programs. For
example. the DISCOS (8 modelinR tool of large capacity) developed by
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center is cur. ~ntly not practical fo~ de-
sign purpose, because of the excessive computing time required and the
questionable value of analytical resulta due to input uncertainties.
Development of on-orbit sensing of structural static deflections
and dynl'lmic motbns and the possibility of re' riting control laws based
on identification of modes in orbit was discussed. The changing of
codes in orbit can be a high-risk arotion for a manned system. The
approacn that should be taken is to design the software and control
systeM with sufficient control-algorithm flexibility to c~ver the
range of expected parameters. This flexibility should be such that
required control system changes reside in the onboard data base.
Control and etabilization during the initial construction phase of
the station presents unique challenges. The full sensor and actuator
complements will not be in place. The initial configuration may not
have the benefit of gravity gradient stabilization. These conditions
need to be factored into the design.
Recent technology program reviews indicated that su~port for control
and stabilization work was to be reduced. It appears to the committee
that this may increase IOC risk.
The committee recommends that:
• NASA mature the technology required for the control and
stabilization of large flexible space station systems '~ith
changing inertia and moment properties.
and that:
• NASA restore funds to the technology development program for
work on active control and stabilization of large, flexible
systems with distributed sensors and controls.
Environmental Control and Life 'Support
There is considerabl~ technology background in the life support
area at the NASA Johnson Space and Ames Research Centers and in
industry. Life support systems incorporating recovery of water and
oxygen hnve been tested in bread-board configurations. Some
subsystems are in their third or fourth generation of technology
development.
Design factors relating to life support system consumables are well
known. One person can consume about i5,OOO pounds of water per year
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*J. 8. n.. ll, S. J. Pidct!tt. and K. H. SeRe. "Hannt>d Sp4ce Station
Environmental Cont~! and Life Support System Computer-Aid~d Technology
Asseulllent Pn'gl"lJ.... SAP. technical paper IBf.OQ'p. 1984.
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"iemhi.l cont-.iAation i. an area of incre•• ina concern a. life
.upport ay.t.. dO":Jro incr...... Wort( ia nee«1C'd on the lIIIo'l••urea,ent
and control of trace and .itrobial cont••in4tion in clOied IYltea••
Biological (ont.aination i. ditcu.a.d later.
Toat ~d f.eilirie. for enviran~nt.l control and tifo aupport
.yltn, a~~ planned and velt intellratted betwen the J\')hnson and .....p.
center •• T~.t b~d. viiI ~upport Phas~ ft activity and t~st data ahould
be available to aupport final .~ac••tation deai,.n and d~v.lopaent
work. Th~•• telt bod' viii h~lp r~.olv. the environmental control and
life .upport ly.teR probl~•• addrol.ed her~.
For the IOC. tho primary n~ed in the environ~nt31 control and lif~
.upporl: IVItC'QII artol IlP~IIU to ~ ••dy dod_ion. on thl!! dl"ftrf·ft of
clolyr. for thC' vllt.r and olllYIl~n .yIl:Nlt. MIne att(>ntion &StIlt h. Riven
to t'lIIior'r...ncy canditionl and OP.,utioM, (or l!u1lIlple, if II prohh·. oc·
c:ura durinlC a eNY chan;:. with double! It.tHinK aboard, the lHe I.JPJloOft
.y.t~. BUlt be abl@ to acc~date the incr@aced lo~d until relief i'
provided.
Fundinll for th~ envirolUlK'ntal control and lire lupport .yate.
progra••pr~ar. to be ad~qu.t., but the pro~r.m n~~d. to b~ ...omin~d
to ••eure .dequ4t~ coverage of the mAtter. addresaed.
Onhoard Propuloion and Fluid.
'.Iud on .~tion. t"lten to H=it funding (or uchnolo8Y develop~nt
related to pro~hinn 4nd fluid., NASA haa tll:;ldtr the dC!cision to utiliu
.tate-of-th~-art t~c~nolo~y for the IOC, i.e., storable propellant
Chydraline) reaction controls or resiltojet. for space .tation control.
l~e.e .yltC!m$ ~'ill provide adequate performance. But, lome tA.ks 1lIlay
require llIOrt! control propellant thlln reasonable hydrazi"e systems can
provide. It would be prud~nt to consider bipropellanta. Hydro~en
and oxygen could be generated in gaeeau. fOrQ fro. vater for theee
small thrusters. This would provide c~}n41ity and im~roved
perfonaance at the expense of pover.
Advanced development effort. "'i 11 focus on propulsion syste",
component life. where a dUlItn goal of 10.000 houu (burn-time) hu
been set. To date. demon,tratlon5 of component life fall CAr short
(one or two orders of magnitude) of this goal.
Because life is more important than performance. tr_de studies
Ihould determine the sensitivity of propultion unit life to red\'ctions
in specific impulse and cha~ber temperature and pressure. Advanced
develop~nt work on resistojets should fOCU3 on propellant selection
and system durabi 1ity.
Several propulsion-related issues deserve attention in the develop-
nent program: contamination. maintenance, lafety. and resupply of
congl~hle.. Effluent. from the Shuttle control .y.t~. degrade viewinl
(or in'tru~nr•• alrhouKh it i. not clear how e.rious or ~rvA.ive
thil prnbl~m ia. Effort to •••ee. conta.ination potenti.le ehould be
undt'rt .ken 10 that, if requ ired, protul'II lid jUlt_nta can he rude.
Even if th~ lO,OOn-hour hUfn-ti~ component life Roal i. achieved,
it vilt h. n.c••••ry to Allow for in.p~ction. aaintenance, .nd repl.ce-
..nt of propuleion .yftt~Q cQaponent.. Attention should he Riven to
.cco~d4rin~ the •• n~~d. in th~ de.lAn of the .ttitu~e control and
It.billz.tion .yateml.
C01'Jlpl)Mnt 1i f. and oPi'ut ional tuts should provide infonul': inn for
.ftf~ty-relat~d proc~dure., in.~ction. ftnd ..int~n.nce. E_••ination
of broader .~.t~m •• f~ty i ••u~. i. imp~r4tiv••
The CONDitt•• va. info~d that Advanced doveloPMent de.linR vith
fluid IIlAMltf.'ll\f!'nt of cryogenic fluids h&lt b....n d..,forrod. 'nIi. rai.u
tvo qu•• tion.. Firat: 1_ the ~~n~ric technology prOF-r•••uffici~nt
to providf! t~chnolo!ty option. for hi~" a~cific: i!llpuhe propulRion and
cryo~enic fluid ..na~q~nt for space atation grovth? Second: What im-
p.ltct dOtls curtail_nt of thia technolofn' d4!veloi!llOO'nt hne on the detign
develo~nt And op0ration of orbiting ..neuverin~ yohiclee (OKV) and
orbit in~ trllnder v~hidu (crrv)T !nit lally, thl!" mfV. put of the Ille
.yaul'll. vi 11 un hydraaine .... propd IAnt. An 011\' burnin3 hydruine
hei~ht~nl conc~rn nVf!r conta.ination. The OTV. a separate and later
develor-ent, 1141 v.ry wt!ll require cryogenic hydroRen and oxygen.
For the reierenc~ space atation, the OMY i. eervic.d in the vicinity
of the radiator array. The ~tter of radiator contamination should be
eX4ained. Rince radiator coatinR materials can he adversely affect~d
by contA~inAtion. Furthermore, the selection ~f hydra.ine to fuel the
OHV raillu quutions of handling and transfer of " todc .ubltance.
Theee questions vere rot being addre ••ed in the t~chnology development
pro~r481.
Us~ of cryoRenic hydrogen and oxy~en for propulsion in the IOC
configuration (including the OHV) could have sever.l significant
.~vant.Res. ~ut requires technoloRY developaent related to lonR-tera
cryogenic storage and maintenance of propellants free froa contami-
nants. Hydrogen/oxYRen sy.te~. can eliminate the need to store and
handle toxic and highly corrosive materials. can elimin.te " potential
contaainant aouree, and can ~reatly aimplify the consumable re.upply
problem (with aignificant long-term cost advantag~s). But, long-te~
storage of cryogenics, I" noted. ie a serious problel'll. Since it is
alraolt certain that the 01V vi 11 uet" cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen for
its propellant, manAge~ent snd storage of large quantities of cryogenic
fluid will be required on the stAtion in the event the 01V operat:.. s
from the station. Thu" it nuty be prudent to considp.f the appropriate
technology development nnd use of cryogenic hydrogen and oXYRen for
propulsion on the IOC and OHV. perhaps even at the expense of deferral
of the IOC date.
The ad hoe cee-ittee rec~nd. that:
• NASA "eviov iu poeit ion aoo technoloRY programs rolated to
cryogenic fluid ..n.Ae~nt And utilizAtion in the apace
station vith • viev to ita e.~ly application.
COmMUnication. and Trackins
The reviev of thift Pl'oJ~c ted COlllll""n icat ion and tuck i nft uc:hnQ lofty
progf._ for tho ap.ce atation in I'tly 1934 concluded that the progra••
v~r. ~mh.rkinA on advanced devel~p~nt. thdt were not requir~d for the
.pace atation. A nlilu·-ter'lll oyHf'1fl definition study h nu,ded to
determine vbat. if Any. technology developeont need. exi.t.
'nle cor.ittee b.lievu that .uentially all the element. of the
syst~ have been developed el.evhere. At most. some s.lpetiv. compo-
nent re~cka&in3 aay be required. and there may be are.s in need of
••lective technoloRY development.
Some of the proposed t ••ks illustrate the committee's concern about
technology development pro£r•• overkill:
-- A near-field te.t (aeilit~ vas proposed for the Johnson Space
Center. A good far-field range 2500 feet long is available at
Johnson. and the Levis Re.earch Center has a near-field facility.
These would be sufficient to tel!t a IO-foot-dial~ter antenna at 12
eKz. providin~ a 0.60 beam and 49-dB gain. about as narrow a be..
• 1 one would use on a space .tation. As an alternative. at 60 CHz.
a 0.60 be.. vould require an antenna 2 feet in diameter. and a
range length of only 480 reet for t ••tinK.
-- Work vas proposed on improved solid state and laser device•• but no
eviuence vas presented that .uch improvement' are 'needed for IOC or
the growth station in the near term.
-- Wor\( vas proposed on a sy.tell to automatically identify nearby
satellites by comparing video imaRes vith a library of possible
shapes. It vould seell far simpler to UBe an audible alarN.
triggered by any vehicle comin~ vithin a preselected rad~r range
and depend on the crev to visually identify the vehicle.
The committee believes that in areft5 such as communicatio~s. for
vhich adequate solutions are availahle using existing technology.
state-of-the-art approaches should be used to the greatest ekt~nt
possible. It is essential that the space station system be defined at
an early date to assist in this selection process '0 that any required
developments in communications and tracking can be identified and
proceed.
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Extra Vehicular Activity
Space luit probl~.e revolve around eli~inatinR or r~ducina the need
for pr~bre.thi"st prior to extra vehicular let ivity (t~VA). eas. of
donnin~ and r~moviol the suit. r~ducin~ .ainteoance and refurbichment.
clo.ioR the life .upport .yet~. to reduce conte.ination from leakage
and v.por exhlu.t. improved hand manipulation, and operational
fluibility.
Benda can occur if air pr~••ure i. reduced by SO p@rcent (or t.e.
nn occ.. ion) vi thout prebreathing of an oxygen-enriched attaO.phere.
thUll. " 8uit At an opeutinjt pru.ur~ of " pound. per .quare inch (peO
i. r~uired to eliminate pr~broathinR for a vearer coeina fro. a .tan-
dard .t.os.ph~r. of 14.7 p.i.
A pfoRr•• ia in place to develop an 8-pai suit. This proRram,
initiated to dlvelop a new suit for the Shuttle, it now coneidered
part of th~ .pac~ atation effort. The teehnoloa, atatu. for develop-
..nt of suit component. and alternate. ia good.
A.tronaut work requir.d to bend suit joint. can be reduced by the
application of con.tant vol~ jointe. The -eat troubl••ome eleacnt
of the .uit i. the Rlove. Clove i~prove~nt, end effector. and power
tool .tudie. are vArranted.
tn the suit prograM, extended range and duration, univeraal fit.
and lower coat are of epeei.l value. In the longer terM. it i.
aeaireble to h~ve plug-in 8upport sub.yate.. for ea.e of onboard
aervicing, .. intenance, and component replacement.
A flexible, routine EVA capability will be important for IOC
a.aeebly and operation. Thus,. no-prebreathing, 8-pai auit with
improved glovea and/or end effectors are iMPOrtant developmenta (or
the program. NASA need. to asaure aggressive development of this
technology.
Human Productivity
Human productivity in space is affected by such factors as: food,
clothing, habitability, hygiene, mediCAl .upport, and ..n-machine
operational interfaces. BAckground is available from studies and
operational experiences in polar exploration, 8ubmarines, and, to a
degree, long-duration aircraft flights. However, it is difficult for
space atation deligners and architects to accept current habitability
apecifications for design.
The Ame. Research Center has organized an activity to focus on space
atation human factors. It will draw on aviation technology with atten-
tion to crew-.achine interface, operations, and training. The Johnson
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Space Center i. purauin3 i.luea of food, recreation, and privacy,
i_portant for lon&-duration, ilolat.d .i.iionl.
A huaan productivity telt bed il under dftvelopment that will be
uled for hardware de.ign end development, and cr~w training.
£x••inetion of luch matter. a. food, personal hygiene, and habitat
design, al ~ll al lon&-duration clo.ed environment, will b~
po.sible. Thil work is important.
The exietinR Ruideline., .t.nd~rd., and r ..quirementl for
cre~chin. integration should be upgraded And made applicable to the
Ipace ;ation. P14n. call (or this to be accol'llplished in FY }CHiS,
in til to .upport Ph.s. 8 de.ign activity.
For long-tena ..nned flir,htl, continuing medical probl~•• include
cardioy••cuier deconditioninl, calcium 10'., and closed environment
.icrobial conte.ination.
FUnding for FY 1985 hal be~n reduced, but the generic pro~r4~ are
believed to be adequate until development requirements become more
focused. It ia expected that technoloRY develop_eRt effort will nerd
to increa•• to support the design of future syste•••
"i.sion Operation. and Station Autonomy
The comNittee believea thst the space station architecture should
be configured to allow early transfer of ground-based mission command
and control center functiona to the epace station. Tnis should, a. is
planned, be part of the system design. The committee believes that
early evolution to an almost autonomous station (if related .tudies
support this p"sition) will reduce the need for, and high cOllt of,
ground-based .i.. ion connand and control center operation. This
capability should be developed consistent with the overall philosophy
of automated diagnostic. in support of atation and experiment opera-
tion, service, and maintenance. The rlevelopment of this onboard
capability will, in the opinion of the committee, in the long term
allow Guicker decision. and action and reduce operational costs.
Situations could develop where ground support is needed. Thu.,
.ose minimal capability to support emergency situations may be a
requirement. Examination of this matter should be part of the Phase B
study program.
The require~ent for achieving space station autonomy will he b~Jnd
up in the nature of the design of the mission control center onboard
the space etation. Thi, center will essentially replace the
ground-based mission control center. Specification of the operational
philosophy and architecture of the apacehorne mission control center
ie a pacing item for the lOC. An exteneive effort will be required to
introduce the elements of .ystem compaction and automation to achieve
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thi. objective. A. h•• bep.n atated, it. i. believed that proRr•• coat.
c.n be reduced by • reduction of ground-.upport activity and an
increase in in-.pace llIutonOftty. Thus, thil duign feature is of gre.t
importance.
The committee recommend. that:
• NASA act to a"es_ and have the .11.ion control functional
to the degree practic.l. carri@d out onboard the apace
.t.tion for loe including having repetitive, vel1-under.tood
.is.ion control function••utONated.
Part of this auton0fll1 iUM involves EVA. For E\lA. the development of
• hiRh-pre••ure (8-pai) Ipace suit with ease of hand m.nipul.tion il
e••enti.l to exereiainathe manned activities cont~pl.ted.
To .upport on-orbit operations. a .eries of specific in.tru~nta
and mochani ••• must be develo~d. Th@se include attitude aen.or••
• enaor. for precise relative po.itioninR {both center of mas. and
orientation> to support rendezyout. activatora for attitude control.
docking and berthing, and near-epaco-.tation traffic controt.
In general. theae probles. are understood by NASA and effort i.
under way to provide teehnology options. Hovever. at present option.
have not been prioritized due to the need to re.olve conceptual deaign
que.tions.
Space Operations
A major decision relates to whether the .pace .tructure. will be
erectabl~ (assembled) or deployable (extendable). The construction
philosophy will influenee technology development in support of
structural subsystems. EVA requirements. and maintenance and repair of
cOlllpone nt s •
Consideration should be given to the impact that crew s.fety will
have on the overall station design. EVA trade-off analyses need to
evaluate the use of automation to reduce extended periods of EVA.
The apace station construction phase will present a higher-risk
environment than the operational phase. Acceptable level. of risk
should be defined. The Phase 8 contractors will address the broad
issue of crew .~fety, including onboard resupply. EVA service, and
crew operations. These need to be compared with guidelines that NASA
defines.
The area of on-orbit operations includes satellite servicing,
maintenance, rendezvous. and berthing. The original on-orbit assembly
of the space station and other large space structures will require
sueh capabilities. which in turn demand advances in engineering design
and in supporting technology.
-~----~--
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An on-orbit operation. philosophy mu.t consider such questions a.
the kinds of satellite aervicing and repair to be provided. i.e •• vill
it be a "shirt aleeve" or a vacuulll environment? The lpeeification of
the operating environment impact. other developmnnta: spAce suits •
• ervice shelter module •• and sup,)Orting equipment.. The level at
which utellites vill be repaired·~(ble, card, or c('M!!ponent--vill
.1so have an impact on the de.ign or the satellite. themselves.
The committee recommend, that:
• NASA specify early the operational mode(n) of on-orbit
servicing and maintenance to ••• iat in definition and de~ign
choices for o~-orbit services.
Program documentation doea not indicate that EVA safety has been
given adequate conaidtration. Questions relate to the re.cue of
.stronallU in the event of the malfunction of an operational support
unit and equiP=ent contsmination associated with the spiIIege of
hydrazine fuel or station effluents.
The c~ittee ~c~nds that:
• NASA define at an early date EVA operational procedures and
8.fety requirements specifying perform4nce bounds and deRign
constraints.
MAintenance
The m&int~n.nce philosophy and the design of structures, critical
.ystems, and aubsystems should be based on the assumptions that.: the
space station viII be a permanent evolutionary system. crew time will
be critical. and systems will be fail safe (long life systems where
failures result in switching to operational components) rather than
have a safe life (very low probability of failure and scheduled change
out of systems vithin a designated time period).
Based on these assumptions, the committee recommends that NASA
integrate and state the following logic in the space station
de.ign/operations maintenance philosophy:
-- Establish ease of maintenance as a design review criterion.
-- Mopt condition maintenance rather than periodic replacement of
components.
-- Establish maximum levels of acceptable system degradation to be
tolerated without corrective maintenance.
-- Maximize the nl~her of maintenance tasks that can he accomplished
in a shirt-sleeve environment as opposed to EVA.
-- Match the definition or replaceable units to dinRnostic capability.
Consider smaller replaceable units 4S onboard diagno6tic capability
develops with time.
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Trade the use of redundancy aRain.t design complexity and logistic
costs to minimize costs considering .uch matter. as down ti~,
abort., and Shuttl@ flight •• Consider redundancy manaRement
technique. that provide multiple redundancy at the caro i~vel in
avionic .ystem••
-- De.iKO the apace station to accommodate gradual introduction of
artificial intelligence for use in diagno.ing .ystellt malfunctions.
-- Develop clear guideline. for replaceable element., i.e., function.,
.ealed (perhap.), and minimum number of connector.lconnection••
Autolll4t ion
Congres. hal suggested that NASA take a lead role in the developmen
of a national automation technology develcpment effort. The committee
believee that NASA should tAke luch a lead role in the areas of automa'
t ion that are part icularly important to space stat ion development.
While the apace-station-oriented work viii not eatiafy all national
intere.ts in the area of automat ion, the cOfSllitt'le believe. that NASA,
while concentrating on its space station task, will be supporting the
development of new technology pertinent to the broad .ubj~ct of auto-
••tion. Thus, NASA will make a major contribution to the national
interest in the execution of their program.
For the space station, a long-t~rm, progrensive application of
automation should be planned and implemented. The division of tasks
between crew and computer i8 not yet well defined but would be a part
of this effort.
The crew should be used for physical and mental duties not practical
to automate and used for monitoring and management for those functions
that can be automated. This will leave the crew as much time as
possible for productive work.
Automation will grow and could be implemented on a time-phased
basis along the followihg lines:
situation and system condition displays (e.g., flight attitude and
system parameters);
eituation and system condition analysis (e.g., orbital error or
system malfunction);
-- operational and system expert advice; and
-- operational and maintenance functions performed automatically.
The committee recommends that:
• NASA recognize and incorporate in the space station program
Congress' interest in automation technology and take a
leadership role in the ar.eas of automation applicable to the
apace station.
...
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On-orbit Operation~
On-orbit operations include satellite servicing; maintenance.
repair. and the assembly/construction of the space atation and other
large apace structures; orbital launch and transfer operations; and
EVA activity. Operational techniquea in support include: tethering.
rendezvous. atationkeeping. and berthing. Berthing could be automatic
or c rew-a ided •
The breadth of work is reflected in this partial list of crew
activitiea: the maneuvering of orbital vehicles. servicing of the
apace station and ita modules. mobile manipulator operation. fuel
atorage and refueling activity. logistics support, EVA support, and
latellite/platform tethering and servicing.
These mattera were not reviewed in depth by the committee, so no
judgment i. made aa to the adequacy of attention directed to these and
related activities. However, NASA needs to assure that they receive
detailed attention.
Onboard Test Instrumentation
Considerable agency attention has been directed toward the develop-
ment of ground-based test beds for subsystem design and verification.
Where there is a need for complete space station system tests, the
tests will have to be made in orbit. It is also po5sible that if
problems arise, such instrumentation could be used for diagnostic
purposes. Consequently, in the desiRO process careful attention needs
to be given to the test protocol and instrumentation requirements for
this purpose. The requisite instrumentation should be placed onboard
during the construction phase of the station. where appropriate. for
in-fl ight operat ional tests and Magnost ics in the event problema
develop.
The committee recommends that:
• NASA make preparations during the design phase for on-orbit
system tests to obtain required in situ performance and
operational data. The planning should include test protocol
and instrument requirements for design and performance
measurements for such matters as structural response. thermal
characteristics. and the tailoring of stabilization and
control response characteristics.
Biological Contamination
An important consideration for the environmental control and
life support system is the monitoring and control of biological
contamination--among the crew. and between the crew and animals,
-- .....
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plants. or other biological matter. This i. anticipated to become
increasingly important as the degree of life support syste~ closure
increases. Spacelab techniques for air filtration into and out of
animal cages and laminar flow work fttations may be adequate for
one-week flights. but may need augmentation for long-life station use
with partial or fully closed life support sysl:ema. Conservative
approaches call for 3 biological barrier between biological work
stations and material and areas normally u»ed by humans. However.
barriers should be dnigned into the station only if jU8tified. To
date. there is insufficient information on microbial huildup and
transfer in closed systems for extended periods of operation to
establish the need for biological barriers.
The committee recommends that:
• NASA pursue research on means for controlling
bacteriological matter. on microfiltration. and on the
identification of tolerable levels of microbial buildup in
closed systems with human operators.
Environmental control experience with nuclear submarines 8S well at
Skylab and the Shuttle obviously should be brought to bear on these
problems.
Structures
A key space station issue for both structural and control system
design is the adequacy of analysis techniques. that is. the de~ree of
structural representation required to analyze structure/control systea
coupling. The complete structure cannot ~e tested on the ground in
the full space environment including zero gravity.
NASA is fully aware of this problem. However. there are design
approaches that can minimize the risks associated with the limitations
of analytical and modeling techniques. Due to the nonlinear stiffness
damping. and distortion characteristics of most space station configu-
rations. as has been noted, the basic structural stack should have a
control system with large stability margins and active and/or passive
means for damping appendage vibration modes. Active as opposed to
passive damping techniques may be required since the ability to
analytically characterize or determine the inherent damping of
representative space station structures through testing on the ground
are limited.
NASA representatives stated that space station element weight would
not be critical beca~se the Shuttle that transports station elements
into orbit would be volume rather than weight limited. Therefore.
increased weight can be traded for reduced cost or complexity of
station elements. This philosophy is questionable considering the
aspects of the space station that are influenced by weight and inertia
\
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loads. Sen~itive .ystems include station control and stabilization,
stationkeeping, and rebooat. Increased weight will require increll8ed
energy for these functions with logistic implications.
Gro~nd rules for erectable versuS deployable structures miRht
reduce the technology programs needed to support station design and
development. It is believed that erectable structures may be les8
complex. more easily maintained and repaired. and will have higher
stiffness in partially erected stageB. It would appear that erectable
structures should be favored and deployable structures used where EVA
is considered impractical.
Materials
NASA stated that the station modules would be fabricated from
aluminum. This may be proper for modules. but it ia believed that
large beam or truss structure8 could be made of composite materials
for their stiffness, mass. and low thermal expansion. Because of
these characteristics. it ia probable that the modules will use some
~umpo8ites for structural components.
Coating material mass loss associated with oxidation due to
atomic-oxygen in low orbits was a concern noted by NASA. Shuttle
experiments indicate that mass loss rates are high for some materials:
pure carbon. mylar. kapton, polyurethane paint. kevlar. and the metal
osmium. However. there arc coating materials that show little, if
any. mass 10s8: teflon. quartz. fused silica, tin oxide. indium tin
oxide. and gold. In general. mass loss rates for carbon-riCh and
unoxidized materials is much higher than for fully oxidized materials.
Due to the range of materials available this does not appear to be a
critical problem.
The question of space charging was not discussed with the committee.
This needs to be considered in the selection of coating materials.
Mechanisms
The technology exists to provide long life control moment gyros of
the size needed for the space station. Some units have heen operated
for over 10 years. having accumulated over 300 component years of
operation without mechanical failure. This experience includes
constant speed rotors. variable speed rotors, and moving gimbals.
Mechanisms of the type needed for solar array positioning and
operation have demonstrated long life capability. Dual spin satel-
lites and three-axis controlled vehicles with movable solar arrays and
antennas have demonstrated long life. TIle space station should con-
sider the proven wind-unwind type of bearing design as well as the
... ._....
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continuous rotation bearings being proposed. Limited rotation system
will simplify fluid and electric power transfer across joints.
Some concern over lubricants was \;xpressed. There are three types
of cormnerc ially aVlli lable lubricants--oi I, grease, and dry fi Im--for
space use. They have exhibited long-term stahility and sustained
performance. The concern with lubricants is high mass 10s8 and
contamination. Experience has shown that proper design of labyrinth
seals, vent paths, and lubricant reservoirs can solve these problems.
It was the view of the committee that significant technolor,y
exists, in the Department of Defense (DOD) and indust.ry, to handle
mechanism design problems. NASA needs to tie more closely to this
technology base.
Thermal Control
On the space station, heat from instruments, equipment, and other
sources will be removed through the use of thermal buses (heat pipes)
that collect and transport unwanted heat to external radiators.
Cold plates to cool instruments and equipment are being developed
at the Johnson Space and Goddard Space Flight Centers. Two-phase
fluid thermal buses to collect and transport the heat are under
study. Compared with single-phase systems, two-phase systems have
lower pumpinR, and thus power requirement.s, by as much as 5 kW for a
representative IOC. If a two-phase system is chosen, on-orbit tests
will be required to examine performance in zero gravity. Such tests
are planned in the Shuttle, but results may come late for design
purposes.
Technology programs covering the major elements of the thermal
control system are cOfllprehensive and appear to be adequately funded
for FY 1985. However, flight experiment plans related to fluid
boiling and condensation and work on refurbishment/replacement of
radiator coatings have been deleted from the program, and as noted
flight experiments come too late to be compatible with the space
station design schedule. In the current program, the technology
development flight tests of two-phase cold plates. buses and
radiators, and construction/erection techniques are planned for
1987-1988.
Con8id~ring the large effect that the thermal control system has on
station design, it appears prudent to accelerate the flight test work
to provide more timely data.
The committee also suggested that NASA study distributed llH>nnal
control systems (8 distributed system may be more practical for statior
growth) compared with the centralized system currently planned. The
." . ' ..... ~
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dissi~~tion of the large heat loads associated with station growth.
and th~rmal controls for orbiting platforms also need to be addressed.
The extent to which the space stat~on thermal systems can be
applied to platforms (commonality) is questionable. Differences in
orbital characteristics and in design requirements may make systems
tailored to the station unsuitable for platforms.
POLICY FACTI>RS
Although the ad hoc committee's major interests were directed at
the engineering and technolo&y deve .. pments. policy matters. both
technical and managerial. have a direct bearing on these subjects and
require program management attention. These matters are addressed
here under the head ings "Technology Policy" and ''Management Po licy."
Technology Policy
The committee's technology policy deliberation identified several
issues related to technology evolution. data management. and
proton ight ing.
Technology Evolution
Since space station development will continue beyond IOC. technology
development plans <road maps) that couple development for key IOC tech-
nologies and technologies for station evolution should be developed
and maintained. The road maps will serve to define the timing and
interaction between these devp,lopments and assist in program planning
for maximizing performance anu minimizing costs.
DOD research and development programs including those of the
Strategic Defense Initiative Program have many elements common to the
space station. NASA could profit from closer attention to this work.
Some examples are very-large-scale integrated circuits, command and
control procedures, and large-scale data processing and computing. It
is considered essential that NASA take this wo~k into account in the
development of the space station.
The committee recommends that:
• NASA take steps to become and stay familiar and knowledgeable
with the research and development in DOD programs pertinent
to the space station and factor this technology into its
technology development and space station definition and
development plans.
In tho area of data aana£o-ent. NASA i. purluina a .oftvar•
• rchit~etur••tratog, that r~coKnir•• n.~d. for: ',It•••uton~.
uniQu" operatll)\'u•. l rtlquir..ntrl •••"-sadu!'u. ir.terhclil' hRltual.'.
appl lcat ion lof (vare for .ytto. _..J unt, and dhtrihufed .Ylter.UI both
in Ip.tce AM on tho 8,,~.nd.
Th. diltdl-uf41'd 'YIUe cont:l!'pt .. bi'lltevett to b. the praporr a;tproach
Co data handlinRAnd i. not con,idered A c~chnololY io.u.. Indu'fry
can provide the ~lectronic hardwAre. The .t4Cul of circuit tochnoloCY
vill control ~C~.l. tile to bo u.~d but viii not li.it tho .peed or
capacity b~lov anClcar-rod ,,~quir.~nt•••k~vor. r•• pon•• to '.'luro.
~.t bo dofin~d ~.rly to help d.tin. r~dund.nc1 conc@pte and hardvAre
require_mt ••
Th••pace .tation d.ta ft.n.R.~nt archit.ctur. i. ~inR .tudi~d by
two c~ntractor. (TKW and HcOOnn~ll-noull •• Aircraft Corporation).
~'r work avpr th~ npxt two YO.f. will ."'.t in tho dofinition of
the data a4n.R~nt .y,t.~. It i. beliov.d that thl. dual effort viiI
further cOMplicAC. the data ~n.ft~ment .y.t~ .~l.ction and intpara-
tion proc.... Tho r~.ult. of thio vor~ are to be tr.n.f.r~d throufth
NASA to the ir.dividual Ph... n connacron. The Ph.... a ('ontucto....
viii bo vorking in parallel vith tho data ..n.&c~nc Iy.t••
contr.ctor••
In thi. procf'u. NASA (unction. a... "third" contractor to pravid.
d.t.~na~~~nt-.y.teadi~ction to the Pha•• I contractor.. NASA
viii be taking on A coapl •• effort in a••~in8 .y.t~.. entin••rina.
inteRration. and 8anale=ent roles.
This complex interface i. en oper4tional/de.ign chillenge @ven for
a aajor contractor who ha. had e~tcnsiv~ .x~ri~nce in d.v.loping
distributed .y.t••• in a common software drv~lo~nt environarnt. It
i ••ugge.ted that N~A .i.plily interface. and allow it. ~oatr.ctor••
• ore active role in this area.
proton iltht ing
Protoflighting i. intended to reduce pratr•• cost by using the ....
hardware in two mode.: ground-baaed teat 4nd rli~ht. While flight
hardware for key o~r.ting subay.teaa would be tested en the Kround.
the aU-up .pac~ Itation could not be tellted prior to a..eably and
operation in orbit.
In earlier apace prORrass, the availability of flight system proto-
type. for testing, down~trea. diar,no.tic •• trouble.hootin~. an~ 'Yfitea
development h•• proven to be of ~on5iderable value. A po.sible conae-
quence of protoflighting i. the 10S8 of this Kfound-b.aed capability
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for d'.eno,ina ftilht probl~. and d.v.lo~nt hardware for It.tion
.rovth.
It NASA', propo.ed ecti~n ~an. flying hardware uled in Rround
t ••t'. the co"'tt•• a~re~. with tho concept •• long al It doe. not
rt'lu it in rCl1Q01f inl hardware frC4 the rcround nf/o(f(.d for t roub to
,hootin! and evolution. If thi. i. the ca•• , the c~itt.e "
con<:.rned.
Th. c08Mitr~. heliev*., with r~~ard to prctoflight. th.t NASA
.hould an.lyte the ~'nd. of I~C~ Itation Iy.t~. changp.. that could be
requir@d. e.I••• the difficulty and co.t of 4ccoaplilhing th~... in
orbit, I"d •••••• the ~.d for a4intaininA Rround-b••ed te.t
cquir-enu to .upport toe opt'ut ion••nli aUt ion ~volut ion.
• NASA d.terain. the «fOYnd-b4••d .y.re.l.ub.y.t~a
require-ont. in support of .. jor .ub.~.t~~ an.ly.~•• in the
ev~nt of tli~ht (ailure., and tor future d...lo~nt.
In .~ ca••• Rround-ba.ed prototype -oc~up, vill b. adequate. But
in .~ .r..... fti~ht .y.te~ duplication viiI be ims~rt.~t. i ••••
avionic-,.lat.d hardware. wh.r~ d.velo~nt.l work ie critically
d.~nd.nt on hardwere fidelity.
The are•• of ••n.R~nt policy that the committee b~li~v~. VArrant
NASA program attention relate to: ailaion and .yate. specification.
prograM conatraintl ...n4Re~}nt controls••y.t~a integration. and
for~iln and DPp.rt~nt of ~fen.e involve~nt.
"i,.ion and Syste•• SpecifiCAtion
Clear 1i.its on sy,t~ de.ign had not b~en established for the
.pace .tation. Without. clear notion of such para~ters A' shape •
• ize. And capability of the .pace atation. contractor participant.
will .elect their own baseline specification for analytical purpose••
These specification. eay or may not coincide vith NASA's. With each
Brudy particip..ant setting conditions. there- is a hiRh probahility that
the ele~nt. of the st~tion vitI not match. The NASA job of 5ysre.
integration and aanagesent vill be made unnecessarily difficult.
The lack of a specific design bale/fram~work has made it difficult
to Cocus the technology develop~ent supporting the program. for
exauple, the coanittee vas briefed on a budget exercise to reduce tech-
nologv development costs. In the ..bsence of a design base, such pro"
..
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prolra••dju.t.-nt. are difficult to a••e•• and can incre••• technic.l
ri.k.
NASA can improve prORr•• (ocu•• even hefor. precise specification.
are d"wl(\~d in Pha.. B. by settinR a gron dtulJtn envelop•• vhich
.fMreu.s Illch thinlt. III po~r. volu.,. veiRht. and atahility. ('.on-
tr.ctor. n~cd thi. intansation tor preli~in.ry de.i~n. Ueer. n~ed the
information for ~x~rieent rlr.iKn. NASA need. the infonsation to
Rduce the di tCiculty of control I inR and ...u.ins .pace Itat ion Iy.te.
d,..ittn aM int('!trlll: iOI\o
All cllrr't'nt I., rl.fin.-d. the prograllll hall no idfOnt ifill"! •• dmain4nt
conAtraints luch 4. C08t. schedule, or ptrro~nce•• For th. tucc.a.
of the pro~r•• it i. essential that these parameterl haw fix~d valuea
or at le.at a li.ited range of value.. The valuea and relAtive iftPOr-
tanee of thes. para~ters should be identified for .ach ph••• of the
progralll.
Wi thout prof;tUIlI constrainta, proRr•• pllrt iei pant a--part kularly
contr3ctors--vill be confu.ed •• to the Ruidelinea to uce. Questiona
could b~: t. lhe SA hillion fi~ur~ a constraint! t. thia a deaagn-to-
coat proRra",? ii' the toc date, 1992, a constraint? II there a single
or a co_hinatlon of pcrforaance p..r.~t~r constraint?
If not provided, the participating contractor. will set con.tr.ints
thellselves to fluide their Analyus. In all J)rohabitity the valuu
selected by individual contractors will not be compatihle. Such
action. in combination vith individual selection of miusion And tyst~
specification•• will maRnify the difficulty of the NASA program
.~nageaent and integration taak.
The committee helieves that any proRrall. vith the possihle exception
of basic research, should have anchor. related to cost, schedule.
and/or perfo~nnee. In 1I0St programs, constraints tend to ~ • cae-
bination of two or more of these factors. A~llo val constrained hy:
pttrformance--'''Ha;t on the tf<)on ..... and 8chedule--tt ••• by the end
of the decade. tt
An additional cost issue relates to projectioo of total pro~ram
cost. The simple fact i. thAt the Administration and Congress, a. the
progr8~ evolves, viii want to knov the cost of the program. At
p~sent the figures of $8 billion and $20 billion are used to cover
toe and development (for the space station alone) through 2000. NASA
vill need to begin to develop cost estimates for related effort, i.e.,
launch, operations. support. and payloads.
·Since the vriting of this report. cost has been identified (in the
RFP) as a progra~ constraint.
f"'""<
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In view of the foreRoing. the committee recomnends that NASA:
.....~-.....
• decide now on program constr4ints, get admi,iatration!
congressional approval of them. publicize them. and once
eltablished. Itick to them.
• review its commitment and approach to design-to-cost and. if
appro~riate. refine and state its design-to-cost goals and
approach and take the necessary implementing actions.
• review its atatements and commitments to the application of
life-cycle cost. In the opinion of the committee. life-~ycle
cost. except in the broadest acnae of the term. is not an
appropriate parame~er for space station design analyses.
considering hardware design. development. 3nd operations.
Itllrdware and annual operating costs might be a better choice
of parameters.
In ord~r to guide trade-off. betveen initial deoiRn and long-term
COltS. some simple. quantifiable measure of p08td~ployment coat v,~ld
be useful. Poe.ihly 4 yearly op~rational cost u~ier 4 specific set of
conditions wodd be a more use!lll reference than life-cycle cost.
Clearly. it is not sufficient to ~tate••s in the draft Phase B RFP.
that "life-cycle coat will be controlled."
Another CORnict •• cone",rn it lack of fttJidance for desittn-to-colt.
It ahoold be re~ber.d that de.ip,n-to-colt no~lly referl to ~
product production co.t. for the spact! Itation. A deaign-to-c.,,,t will
includl!' d~.ir.n. rlevC!lopftW'nt and pfodllction coeta. Ther~fou. 'fHtdal
con.ideution ftIU.t be given to definition of thct tern duign-to-<:olt.
The draft nquut for propoul (IU'P) for Pha.. 8 doel not idMt ify or
allocate coat by progr•• ol~~nt. If d@.ign-to-coat il to be a
corner.tone of the .pace station. NASA viII havo to provide. more
detailed definition of the tel'1lll and require contractor. to eltabli.h
and enforce related desiRn-to-eost Koall and ~cthod••
For the .pace Itation... perforeance conetraint ha. been tacitly
establilbed: provide a permanent ••volvable. inhahir~d facility for
relearch. technology development. application. ~nd co~rciAl ule in
low ~arth orbit. To be effective. this conltraint n~edl to b••mpli-
fied in terQI related to capacitic •• support. and service.. The
committee believe. that at le•• t one other constraint il need~d. i ••••
on orhit by 19Q2. but n~t later than 199~; or a coat for certain
capability not to exceed a specific dollar level.
A related m4tter il life-cycle COlt. Th~ Ph.,. B propos.l••tate
that 1i(e-cycle ccsta vitI be controlled. Howcve~. for the ap.ce
.tation progue. ··lif~ cycle lt ie 41"1 aml,iguo\11 t.,r1'll. The stet ion. by
definition. i, modified. added to. And extended in terms of capacity
and performance. Indeed. whAt i. the life cycle of the ItAtion?
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The .uigl\lMnt of space ltation effort in four m• .Jor V{)rk packagol
to different NASA centers (supported by one or more team. of (on-
tncton~ introduce,. compluity in prottul'll manallement. ElClcerbat inR
thil i.e the dietribution of systC'III' t!n~tineeri.n8 and inte~ration (SE&I)
funet iona among the centers and the long-tena nature of the prof;r4Ill.
Clearly. there ia a need for rfgoroul pfoRralll management and change
control. There ia a potential for cost growth and schedule alippege
if a tight chans. control moth.nil. i. not eatabliahed early.
The .an4ge~nt proce.s proposed by NASA i. complex with many
decilion nodes and iterative loops. A program of the .ize and
complexity of the apace atation viiI b~ difficult to Illanage under
thel. conditions. At the time of this reviev there vere no clear
ay.tem de.iRn li.itl; ther@ va. no clear and un~quivocal centralited
prosr•• authorit,. there va. a cumbersome manaso-ent .y.t~•• there va.
a diltributed. potentiftlty ineffective change-control procell; and
there vae a distributed SE&I activity.
The committee believ•• that the apace Itation should be considered
and treated .s a facitity--a l~bor4tory, a factory, a test facitity. a
habitat. It 'hould be de.i~n@d to provide a w@ll-characteril~d atan-
dard enviornment: utilities. interface., eervice•• lORi.tical support.
and crev accol!ftOdations. It must be easily u8f!d by cu.t~ra. but
customers should not dictate desiRo beyond liQits of affordability.
What is called for i. a fixed capability vith standard interfaces and
proced~re. to fteet most anticipated need••
It is the opinion nf the committee. a. has been discus.ed. that
••nagement controle. al ~ll 4. technology selection and design. should
flov from known design. development. and operational conltraints. If.
philosophically, the apace station program is thought of .s a standard
facility. the program definition and development task viII be simpli-
fied compared vith trying to satisfy long-term, undefi"able customer
forecasts (as appears to be the ease). Neither technology, design.
nor manageeent can ~e adequately focused until a facility design
philosophy il identified and documented.
The committee reco~nds that NASA:
• establish. now, a clear desi~n, development. and operational
philosophy that includes a standard faci Hty concept.
• establish,.s 800n .s possible, specifications for a core
utilities c«pability vith 8tan~4rd interfaces and operational
and logistical support limits and be intolerant of change.
• reviev its proposed change control procedures and revi.e
them so thQt they are reasonable. clear. consistent. and
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ri8oroua with minimum interface.. They =Ult be deaigned to
outlaat individuale and oraanil.tiona.
Syetea Int.aration
NASA i. organiling to do the .pace .tation 'Ylt~ prime program
• "~Re~~nt and .ystem ~nager/int"aration function in~hou.e. NASA ..y
be under•• timatin3 the ca.plexity of the ta.k and the capability
r~~uired to perform it.
NASA ha, perfor~d •• Iy.t•• integrator previously--vitne'l
management of acientific I.tellite programl. Generally, the Icience
.atellite prosraml were aaligned to a aingle center that had total
control. But, the diver.ity ftnd complexity of the .pace .tation
prOlra. ia ~ch Kreater. The Apollo program approached the complexity
of the projected .pace .tation proftr•• , but the Ipace atation will be
more complex due to mi •• ion, growth, 10gi.ticI, and lifetime. The
Apollo program employed .y.tem. support contractora (Bell Com and
Boeiftl) •
The 118nag...nt ph i l080phy for the apace Itat ion prognlll, III the
eem.ittee perceives it. involve. five centers operating with relative
autonomy under the overall program leader.hip of a lead center--the
Johnson Space Center. It ia not apparent thet there i. a clear line
of authority for the program. Although the title Program Office il
mentioned, there doca not appear to be, .s yet. 4 Program Office in
the u.ual definition of the term. Neither hu the cO\Sllittee discerned
a Program Director-~that il. a single individual with .peciflc, clear
responsibility and authority to manaRe the total program including all
major contract activity. It leems, in fact, that there are leveral
program director. with varying responsibilities and authoritie. within
NASA'. field center. a.lociated with the major sub.yateal. In the
view of the cOfIIllittee, this compl icatea the program management and
integration task.
It appears that each center will conduct it. own research and
development program; have its own change and configuration control
procedures; and have its own cost, schedule, and performance goa18 and
aea.urement syltems. This will include, in assigned areas, a large
amount of autonomy and their own contracting lIuth'lrity with contractor.
rewards and penalties that may differ for the same contractor. working
for different centers.
In principle, with the proper cen~r.lized management, authority,
.kills, and resources, including data, physical aid~, and people, the
management/integration task could be done effectively. But of concern
is whether NASA will be able to assign the proper critical massea of
people and .kills to do the job.
,
,
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The committee envisionl 4 manaRement syltem where reaponaibility
and authority are a»signed to an individual in 4 lingle office that i.
equipped with facilities and .taff to do the dem.nding mSnaRftment job.
In view of the present confederated mananement ayatem, the committee
raises the queation, will NASA be able to move, .1 the program evolvea,
to the type of management eyatem the committee judges to be more
appropriate?
The committee bcliev~. that NASA would be well advised to reexamine
ita manage~nt plan. Seyeral alternative approaches are possihle: a
prime contractor, • leder.tty contracted development center, or an
integrating contractor.
A prime contractor with total system performance responsibility
would have the possible disadvantagel of NASA cOmRitting to I lingle
contractor for a long time period and aciding COlt to the pros ram. In
addition, the contractor would be paid from progrmm fund., where••
NASA in-house manage~nt is paid from institutional funds.
A federally contracted develop~nt center such .s Aeroap4ce or MITRE
would h~ve the possible drawback of not haYinR the depth or experience
to perform the task, and it might prove difficult to a••~mble the
required experienced personnel. The .s.ignment-of-coat ia8ue arises
here too.
An integrating contractor who would accept ft hardware~xclu.ion
clause (will not undertake related hardware design or conotruction) i.
the method th~t the Air Force ha~ used for intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICSM,). In this Air Force work. for example. TRW haa been
the integrating contractor, under the control of the Ballistic Misaile
Office (8HO), formerly the Ballistic Hissile Division. TRW has super-
vi.ed associate contractors and performed the integration task as an
extension of the 8MO. This arrangement has generally worked well for
the Air Force. is currently employed on the Peacekeeper program. and
will probably be u.ed on the strategic ICBH program. The committee
believes that NASA should, in its manag~ment system review. consider
the SHO modus operandi for the space station program. If similar
action is indicated, earty attention would be de.irable because of the
time involved in bringing a contractor into the program.
As would be the case for the other management alternatives noted.
the cost of an integrating contractor would be charged to the program
budget. not the NASA personnel and management budget. Nonetheless. the
committee believes that contracting for system management support would
be prudent. O~B Circular A-76 ("Performance of Comtl\{!rcial Activitie ....
August 1983) could be invoked to support this action. The circular
enunciates a policy of contracting wllere possible. It is believed that
the out-of-house effort could be justified operationally and
Hnanc lally.
--
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The committee further believes that NASA should consider the
establishment, aa 800n .a po.aible, of a central .pace atation progra~
office headed by • director with total programmatic and technical
authority. It!a important that the director have direct accesa to
the adminietrator of NASA, independent of where the office i8
j establi.hed.
It i. the committee's recommendation that NASA:
• rea_aess ita approach to program mAnagement and integration,
dirocting attention to estQbli.hing a space atation proRram
..nager who will have full, complete responsibility and
authority over the entire program--over all NASA and
contractor element••••ociated with the program--and will
have direct acee•• to the Administrator.
Foreign and Department of Defena. Involvement
NASA haa stated as a matter of policy and has actively pursued
foreign government involvement in the space station program. DOD
involvement, if any, is not resolved. The committee's concern is that
if DOD does become involved in the program as a matter of national
policy and interest, classified work (national or for that matter
international) viII not be compatible unless certain actions are taken
during the design ph.ae of the program.
Although not a mis.ion requirement. the committee believes that the
space station program i. ideally suited for DOD experiments. The
problem is the DOD-program-related experiments will be classified and
will need to be conducted under stringent security.
Involvement of our allies and trading partners in the space station
progr~m haa been stated as a national objective and is hiRhly desir-
able. Through this ~ction, program content can be enlarged. Foreign
investment serves foreign policy interests, and foreign participation
in the program portray. the United States 48 a world technical leader
whose hand is extended in friedship.
But, if the space station is to accommodate DOD experimental work,
security requir~ments have to be resolved. Foreign involvement re-
q~ire8 an open program. DOD involvement requires a closed environment.
The committee believes that this incompatibility can be resolved
through system and dot. flow isolation, which with careful design will
require a llIinimum expenditure of funds. The cOll'lllittee doee recognize,
however, that DOD participation will raise questions and could deter
lome foreign involvement in the program.
I~
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The committ~e recommend. that:
• NASA continue to I.ctively puraue foreign government
invol~ement in the space station program.
• NASA help resolve the national po.ition rCRardinR DOD
involvement in the space station program through the
AdministrAtion and ConKres••
It is further recommended that NASA take action to ~n8ure an sbil
to accommodate DOD experiments until the DOD involvement question i.
resolved. Thus:
• NASA should consider acco~~ation requirement. during
definition and deaig" activity. Accommodation would involve
provision. for isolation of experiment compartment., data
bases, data handling, and communications. Other probable
needs are hi~h power levels, large computational capability,
and high pointing accuracy.
• NASA should make DOD (particularly the Director of the
Strategic Defense Initiative Program) aware of NASA actions
and prepare to arrange for adequate permanent DOD
representation in the space Iltation program.
CLOSING COMMENTS
The ad hoc committee has reviewed NASA's ongoing and planned
research and technology development programs and engineering approacl
pertinent to the evolving space station program.
The committee carried out its study in the formative period of th.
space station program. During the study period, the program offices
at NASA hparlquarters and its centers were organiEed and in the procel
of beio& staffed, and an RFP for space station definition and pre-
limiaary design studies, Phase B, was developed and released to
industry with awards scheduled for April 1985.
It is the hope of the committee that its deliberations are useful
to NASA in the conduct of this important national program.
.....
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APPENDIX A
Space Station References--Selected Listing
George Low. "Manned Space Flight." in NASA, NASA-Industry Pregrsrn
Plans Confer~. July 1960.
The early Langley studies are sun'llllarized in Langley Research Center,
Report on the Research and Technological Problems of Manned Rotating
Spacecr4ft, NASA Technical Note D-I054. August 1962.
Douglas Hi~Bile and Space Sy.terns Division. Douglas Aircraft Co••
"R"!port on the Development of the Manned Orbital Research Laboratory
(HORL) System Utilization Potential," Report 8M-48822, January 1966.
Studies during the 1960s at LRC. HSC. and HSFC are summarized in
Langley Research Center, ~ompilation of Pa~ers Presented at the Space
Station Technology Symposi~. February 11-13, 1969.
Wi llilllm NOrtllyle. "NASA Aims at 10o-Man Station," Aviation Week and
Space Technolo&I, February 24. 1969.
NASA. "Statement of Work: Space Station Program Definition
(Phase B). tI Apri I 14, 1969.
Frederick I. Ordway III. "The History. Evolution. and Benefits of the
Space Stat ion Concept. tI presented to the XII I Internat iona 1 Congress
of the History of Science. August 1971.
Jack C. Heberling, "The Management Approach to the NASA Space Station
Definition of Studies of the Manned Spacecraft Center." NASA Technical
Memorandum X-58090, June 1972.
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics. Manned Orbital System Concepts Study.
Book l--Executive Summary. September 30. 1975.
U.s. Senate, Committee on AeronautiCal and Space Sciences. NASA
Authorization for FY 1977. Hearings.
NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. Space Operations Center: A
Concept Analysis, November 29, 1979.
NASA's attempts to gain support for this large program are described
in John Lodsdon. liThe Policy Process and Large Scale Space Efforts,"
Space Humanization Series. Vol. 1. No. 1 (1979).
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W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson,~ and Working in Seace:
The History of Skylab (Washington: NASA SP-420B, 1982).
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Salyut--Soviet Step'
Toward Permanent Human Presence in Sp~e, 1M. December 1983.
NASA. "Space Station Advanced Development Progrslll," July 2. 1984.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION.
Reference configurations for the Space Station manned core, the man-tended
option and tht unmanned platforms ~ert dtrtved to lid in the definition ot
systtm requirL~cnts, to assure the feasibility of accept3~le custc~e~
&cc~dations. and to provide a ~~sis for evaluation of contractor
propoSAls. "n ovtrview of these configurations is presented in this
section. A detailed preSfntatfon of ~,t reference configuration design
characteristics is contained in ·Space Statfon Reference Configuration
Description,· JSC-19989, accession no. J8400076.
2.0 ~ANNEO CORE ~EFERtPtCE CmlF'tGURATlCH •
.-
The referel'" co"cept presented in this section is representative of a
family of confi9urations wnich has been studied extensively by both NASA
.nd industry. This family is characterized by a c~~n set of elements
which Art 4ss~bled in various ways to meet 4 nUll".ber o( different design
priorities. The elements are:
I. Pressurized modules.
b. Artfculated solar-inertial power generatfcn dey1c~s.
c. Assembly hardware which connects the modules and power devices
And ~hich supports externally mounted systems. payloadS. and facilities.
The reference configuration described herein aSSembles these el~ents in
such a ~ay so as to ~ax;~;ze custcmer viewing oc;ortunitfes and to provide
versatility in station 2rOwth "nile meeting other custo~er and operational
requirements and constraints. Ho~ever, it is f~it that significant
improvements are possible due to the limited shelf life and depth of
examination to this reference confi9uration. Therefore, the contractor is
encouraged to examine other configurations within this family or propos.
modifications, large or s~all to th~ reference configuration. A
configuration belonging to another conce,tual f~~il1 ~ay be prese~ted in
an alternate propos~l.
2.1 Confiquratfon Overview •
•
Table C-S-I su~arizes the cha~acteristics of the manned core in both
initial and growth phases of build-up. Layouts and isometric views of the
reference configuration in these phases are presented in fi9ures C-5-1
through C-5-4. Note that both photovoltaic and solar dynamic power
generation systems are shown to demonstrate design options rather than to
advocate a particular initial system selection or growth path.
2.2 Flight Mode Descr;ot;on.
The reference configuration is flown with a small pitch angle in the orbit
plane such that no momentum. due to aerodynamic and gravity gradient
C-s-s
1-
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TASLE C-5-1.- MANNED CORE DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS
INITIAL GROm
ALTITUOE 500 lOt sao kH(270 H. MI.) (270 N. HI.)
INC1.INATION 28.5· 28.5·
AYG. BUSS POWER 7S KW 300 KW
CREV SIU: 6 18
NO. PR£SS. MODULES 5* 10
* HABITABILITY MODULE 11
HABITABILITY MOOULE 12
LABORATORY MOCULE '1
LABORATORY MODULE #2
LOGISTICS MOCULE
(REFERENCE CONFIGURATION OULY)
C-5-6
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FIgure C·5·1 INITIAL MANNED CORt! • ISOMETRIC
(Rr£FERENCE CONFIGURATION ONI..V)
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torques, are accumulated over an orbit. This flight mod, is known as an
average Torque Equilibrium Attitude (TEA) flight mode. The pitch
attitUde, which is maintained with eNG's, is adjusted to account for major
changes in station mass properties. Mo~ntum is accumulated on the roll
and yaw axes by CMG's which are dumped periodically through the use of
magnetic torquers and/or ReS thrust~rs. •
" 2.3 Payload Acco!MlOd~tion •.
•
Table C-S-II summarizes payload accommodations provided by the reference
configuration. These accom~~dations include payload viewing, construc-
tion, servicing, and OMV/OTV support. Figure C-5-5 identiftes these
acc~~dations on a reference configuration layout.
2.4 "In-Tended Option.
Included in the family of configurations associated with the reference
Sp~c. Station concept is an alternative (figure C-S-61 that delays the
introduction of the manned habitat fr~~ 3 to 5 y~ars following initial
depl~ment of the basic Space Station. During this 3 to 5 year interval,
the Space Station would function in a man-tended mod@. Pursuant to
Congressional directive. NASA is requiring offerors to include in their
proposals how they would study this alternative configuration. The
configuration should be examined from the standpoint of its inherent
capability to fulfill requirements, considering basic oper~tions in an
automated mode, with intermittent manned operations as constratned by the
NSTS as currently conceived. In addition. offerors selected for
negotiations will be require~ to examine the ODT&E and life-cycle costs of
this man-tended configuration, comparing them to the reference
con'i guration.
3.0 UNHArmED PLATFORM REFERENCE CmlFIGURATrOU.
The SSP reference configuration includes co-orbiting and polar~orbitin9
platforms with the characteristics summarized in table C-5-11I. The
platform reference configuration is presented in figures C-5-7 and C-5·8.
The platform utilizes Space Station elements. subsystems, and components
to the extent ~hfch is practical and cost effective. The capability for
modular growth is incorporated in the design. While the platforms
incorporate station elements, the ultimate platform design is not
constrained to have a physical resemblance to the Space Station. A
single, multipurpos~ platform design i$ presented, incorporating features
that allow easy on-orbit fnterchange of fnstrument or processing module
p~loads at a standardized interface. Platform subsystems are also easily
interchanged at standardized interfaces, so that the platform can remain
permanently in orbit.
C-S-ll
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TABLE C-5-II.- MANNED CORE PAYLOAD ACCOMMODATIONS
o SOLAR/STELLAR VIEWING
o MOUNTED AT UPPER END OF CENTRAL TRUSS
o CAPABILITY TO VIEW EARTH'S LIMB
o EARTH VIE~ING
o MOUNTED AT BOTTOM OF CENTRAL TRUSS
o CONTINUOUS VIEW OF EARTH LIMB TO LIMB
o LARGE SPACE STRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION
a LOCATED AT BOTTOM OF ~ENTRAL TRUSS
a NEAR VICINITY FOR EVA. MATERIALS T~S?CRT FROM ORBITER
o SATELLITE SERVICING
a MAINTE~ANCE. REPAIR. AND STJIUGE ACCC:-1MUOATIONS
o LOW CONT~~INATICN STORAGE .;NO SERVIC!~G
o OMV/OTV SUPPORT
a SERVICING. MAINTENANCE. REPAI~. AND STORAGE ~CCCMMOOATIt
a PROPELLANT NEAR C.G.
(REFERENCE CONFIGURATION ONLY)
C-5-12
TABLE C-S-III.- UNMANNED PLATFORM DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS .
* Includes 3 KW housekeeping power
..
•
98.2-
23 KW *
28.5 0
23 K'tI '*
GllOWTH PLATfORM
-- -
CO-ORBIT ~
98.2-
8 KW '*
(REFERENCE CONFIGURATION ONLY)
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CO-ORBIT POLAR
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23.5-
8 KW *
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